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THE NATURAL RATE HYPOTHESIS, with its corollary  that demand  manage- 
ment policies cannot affect an economy's long-run average level of 
unemployment  or output, has come to be widely accepted even by 
Keynesian economists. This view is enshrined  in standard  textbooks: 
Robert  Hall  and  John  Taylor,  for example, "  stress . ..  that  macro  policy 
cannot  influence  the average  rate  of unemployment.  It can  only influence 
the fluctuations  of unemployment  around  the natural  rate.  " 
In this paper  we raise questions  about  the validity  of the natural  rate 
hypothesis and argue that demand management  policies can and do 
affect not  just the variance,  but also the mean, of output  and  unemploy- 
ment. As a way of comparing  the effectiveness of different demand 
management  policies in stabilizing  national  economies, we return  to the 
much-discussed comparison of  macroeconomic performance in the 
United States and other industrial  nations before and after World  War 
II. Previous explorations  of macroeconomic  performance  in historical 
perspective  have focused either  on the volatility  of output  about  trends 
or  on the volatility  of changes  in output.2  But volatility  is not the relevant 
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2. See, for example,  Arthur  F. Burns,  "Progress  toward  Economic  Stability,"  Amner- 
ican  Economic  Review,  vol. 50  (March  1960),  pp. 1-19;  J. Bradford  De Long  and  Lawrence 
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measure if, as Keynes and the early Keynesians believed, successful 
macroeconomic  policies fill in troughs  without  shaving  off peaks. 
Using the prewar  GNP series created  by Christina  Romer  to correct 
for excess cyclical variability  in the standard  Kuznets-Kendrick-Gall- 
man series, we find evidence of considerable improvement  in U.S. 
macroeconomic  performance  since World War II.3 The average gap 
between  real  aggregate  demand  and  the potential  supply  of the economy 
has been reduced since the pre-Depression  period by an amount that 
would now run at almost $50 billion a year. This improvement  in the 
performance  of the U. S. economy  relative  to potential  is conventionally, 
and we think correctly, attributed  to the more stable financial  system, 
automatic  stabilizers, and possibly improved  discretionary  macroeco- 
nomic  policies  that  together  make  up  the  postwar  Keynesian  institutional 
order  and have managed  demand  for the past 40 years. 
H. Summers,  "The Changing  Cyclical Variability  of Economic Activity in the United 
States,"  in Robert J. Gordon, ed.,  The American Business  Cycle: Continuity and Change 
(University  of Chicago,  1986),  pp. 679-733;  Charles  Schultze,  Other  Times,  Other  Places: 
Macroeconomic  Lessons fromn  U.S.  and European Histoty  (Brookings,  1986); Martin N. 
Baily, "Stabilization  Policy and  Private  Economic  Behavior,"  BPEA, 1:1978,  pp. 11-60. 
All focus on the variability  of output  about  trends.  Steven M. Sheffrin,  "Have Economic 
Fluctuations  Been Dampened?  A Look at Evidence  Outside  the United  States," Journal 
of Monetaty Economics, vol. 21 (January  1988),  pp. 73-84, examines the variance  of 
annual  output  growth  rates  and  finds  no sign  of significant  stabilization.  We find  Sheffrin's 
examination  of the variability  of growth  rates  only to be inappropriate  because we do not 
see any close connection  between the variability  of annual  growth  rates and economic 
welfare. 
3. The Kuznets-Kendrick-Gallman  series is the standard  GNP series used in U.S. 
Department  of  Commerce,  Bureau  of  the  Census,  Historical  Statistics  of  the  United 
States, Colonial Times to 1970 (Government  Printing  Office, 1975). Discussion of the 
Romer series can be found in Christina  Romer, "Spurious Volatility in Historical 
Unemployment  Data," Journal  of Political  Economy,  vol. 94 (February  1986),  pp. 1-37; 
"Is the  Stabilization  of the  Postwar  Economy  a Figment  of the  Data?"  American  Economic 
Review, vol. 76 (June 1986),  pp. 314-34; "Gross National  Product,  1909-1928:  Existing 
Estimates,  New Estimates,  and  New Interpretations  of World  War  I and  Its Aftermath," 
Working  Paper2187  (National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  1987);  "The  Prewar  Business 
Cycle Reconsidered:  New Estimates  of Gross National Product,"  Journal of Political 
Economy  (forthcoming,  1989).  Romer's  estimates  are in their turn  artificially  smooth- 
they omit  that  part  of GNP variability  uncorrelated  with  contemporaneous  movements  in 
commodity production. Her work has sparked a debate that includes David Weir, 
"Unemployment  Volatility:  A Sensitivity  Analysis"  (Yale University,  1986);  and  Nathan 
Balke and Robert  J. Gordon,  "The Estimation  of Prewar  GNP: Methodology  and New 
Evidence," Journal  of Political  Economy  (forthcoming,  1989).  We use the Romer  series 
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We first  stress that the economy's average  level of unemployment  is 
likely to be inefficiently  high;  an increase in the average  level of output 
is likely to be desirable  whether  or not the operation  of the natural  rate 
property makes it infeasible.We go on to review recent theoretical 
developments  that suggest alternatives  to the natural  rate hypothesis. 
Recent  years  have seen the emergence  of a variety  of theoretical  models 
that exhibit multiple equilibriums  associated with different levels of 
production.  These models, which capture  many of the ideas discussed 
in The General Theory,4  rely on mechanisms  like credit failures, low- 
level demand  traps, and asymmetries  in price adjustment  to generate 
economies with multiple  equilibriums  at which the forces pushing  for 
full use of resources are at most very weak. If, as is plausible,  demand 
management  policy can affect which of the many  possible equilibriums 
an economy attains, it can have a lasting effect on the level of output. 
One piece of evidence that suggests that these theories have empirical 
backing  is the asymmetric  response  of U.S. output  to nominal  shocks. 
Turning  to the data,  which are  discussed and  built  up in the appendix, 
we begin by examining  the serial correlation  of output over the pre- 
Depression and postwar periods. The time series properties  of output 
have been a major  issue in the rapidly  growing  literature  on the presence 
of "unit roots."  5 Some investigators  have concluded that output fluc- 
tuations are dominated  by permanent  shocks-that  a 1 percent fall in 
output this year means that forecasters should revise downward  their 
forecast  of output  a generation  hence by the full 1  percent  or even more. 
This dominance  of permanent  shocks has been interpreted  as revealing 
that macroeconomic  fluctuations  arise not from the demand side but 
from  permanent  changes  in the economy's production  technology.6  We 
show, following  John  Cochrane,  that  substantial  persistence  in output  is 
largely  a postwar  phenomenon  both in the United States and in the rest 
of the West.7 Before the Depression, permanent shocks to output 
4.  John Maynard Keynes,  The General Theory of Employment,  Interest and Money 
(Macmillan,  1936). 
5. For  example,  John  Y. Campbell  and  N. Gregory  Mankiw,  "Are  Output  Fluctuations 
Transitory?"  Quarterly Journal  of Economics,  vol. 102  (November  1987),  pp. 857-80. 
6. Matthew  D. Shapiro  and Mark  W. Watson, "Sources of Business Cycle Fluctua- 
tions," Working  Paper  2589  (NBER, 1988). 
7. John  Cochrane,  "How Large  Is the Random  Walk  in GNP?"  Journal  of Political 
Economy,  vol. 96 (October  1988),  pp. 893-920. 436  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
accounted for at most a small part of the year-to-year variance in 
production. 
Some of this increase in persistence might arise from an increased 
variability  of potential output and technology growth since the war. 
More  plausible  in our view is the hypothesis  that most of the shift in the 
serial correlation  properties  of output arises from successful demand 
management  policies that  have largely  eliminated  the transitory  declines 
in output,  caused by movements  to inferior  equilibriums,  characteristic 
of the prewar period. That unemployment  rates were more skewed 
before World  War  II than they have been since lends additional  plausi- 
bility  to this hypothesis. 
To estimate the size of the postwar improvement  in performance 
relative  to potential,  we construct  average  output  gaps by interpolating 
potential GNP between major  cycle peaks. Our output gap measures 
suggest substantial  improvement  in performance  not only in the United 
States  but  also abroad.  We also show some empirical  support  for  viewing 
business cycles as gaps rather than as cycles around supply-driven 
trends. The existence of  cyclical asymmetries, the correlations of 
constructed gaps with observed unemployment,  and the stronger  re- 
sponse of output  to negative  than to positive monetary  shocks together 
suggest  that  the gaps  view may  provide  a more  accurate  characterization 
of fluctuations  than  does the more  standard  view of fluctuations  as near- 
symmetric  cycles around  unique  equilibrium  trend  levels of output  and 
unemployment. 
The data analysis in the main body of the paper deals with the pre- 
Depression and postwar  periods. Omitting  the largest  transitory  fall of 
output  below potential  biases the case against  finding  either  a significant 
improvement  in  performance  in  the  postwar  era  or  evidence  that  business 
cycles are best thought  of as asymmetric  lapses beneath potential, not 
symmetric  fluctuations  about  trend.  In the final  section of the paper,  we 
examine  the Depression  in some detail. The recovery  from  the Depres- 
sion carried  U.S. output almost all the way back to its pre-Depression 
trend  even before  the stimulus  of World  War  II began  to affect the level 
of U.S. production.  The level of production  reached  immediately  before 
World  War  II suggests that, despite greatly  reduced  capital  investment 
and a substantial  labor  force withdrawal,  the Depression  does not seem 
to have cast a large  forward  shadow onto U.S. output. This argues  for 
theories  of multiple  equilibriums  based on considerations  other  than  the J. Bradford De Long, Lawrence H. Summers  437 
accumulation  of human  and  physical  capital. 
Cycles vs. Gaps 
The proposition  that the U.S. economy's equilibrium  level of output 
is inefficiently  low is relatively  uncontroversial. To begin  with, substan- 
tial tax rates on labor income create a wedge between the private and 
social returns  to increased  employment.  In addition,  the pervasiveness 
of monopoly power in the economy creates some presumption  that 
output is below its efficient level. This presumption  is reinforced by 
evidence that the reservation  wages of the unemployed  are frequently 
considerably  below going  wages, and  by arguments  involving  congestion 
effects as the unemployed  search  for work.9 
It follows that  increases  in the economy's average  level of output  and 
employment would almost certainly be beneficial. The extra output 
generated  would almost certainly  more than compensate  for any extra 
wear and tear on capital  goods. Demand management  policies should, 
therefore,  be used  to raise  the average  level of output-if this  is feasible.  10 
8. Hall and  Taylor,  Macroeconomics,  use a social welfare  function  that  is symmetric 
in deviations  from  the natural  rate  of unemployment.  They, however,  adopt  this primarily 
for  analytical  convenience,  arguing  (pp.  490-91)  that  "economists  have  thought  less about 
the costs of episodes when GNP is above potential. The microeconomic  argument 
supporting  the idea  that  costs are  important  is the  following:  The extra  work  effort  needed 
to push  GNP above potential  is worth  more  than  is the extra  GNP. Instead  of working  as 
many  hours  as they do during  a boom and  consuming  and  investing  the extra  output,  the 
public  would  be better  off with  less output  and  more  time  to spend  on their  children,  their 
houses, and in recreation."  But they too believe that "there is at least a range  where a 
boom is socially beneficial  even though  it is privately  costly to workers  to be working 
longer  hours." They attribute  this asymmetry  to tax distortions  that push average  labor 
supply  below its optimal  level. 
9. Arthur  M. Okun, "Upward  Mobility  in a High-Pressure  Economy," in Joseph  A. 
Pechman, ed.,  Selected  Essays  of Arthur M. Okun (MIT Press,  1983), pp.  171-220.  See 
also Arthur M. Okun, The Political Economy of Prosperity (Brookings,  1970); Prices and 
Quantities: A Macroeconomic  Analysis (Brookings,  1981). 
10. Even in new Keynesian models, it may not be. Many menu cost models, for 
example,  have the property  that  the average  level of output  is below the optimal  level but 
that  all policy can do is iron out fluctuations.  See Olivier  Jean Blanchard  and Nobuhiro 
Kiyotaki,  "Monopolistic  Competition  and  the Effects  of Aggregate  Demand,"  American 
Economic  Review, vol. 77 (September  1987),  pp. 647-66; also Laurence  Ball and David 
Romer,  "Are  Prices  Too Sticky?"  Working  Paper  2171  (NBER, 1987). 438  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
IMPLICATIONS  OF  NATURAL  RATE  THEORIES 
That  the business cycle consists of repeated  transient  and  potentially 
avoidable  lapses from  sustainable  levels of output  is a major  piece of the 
Keynesian  view: there is often room  for improvement,  and good policy 
aims to fill in troughs  without shaving  off peaks. This Keynesian view 
stands in opposition to the natural  rate view that the business cycle is 
due  to expectational  errors  that  alternately  push  the economy above and 
below its sustainable  growth  path. This natural  rate view implies, even 
in its variants  most hospitable  to Keynesian  concerns, that  the scope for 
macroeconomic  policy to affect welfare  is small. 
The  heart  of the natural  rate  view is the claim  that  the relation  between 
production  and prices is well captured  by the stylized Phillips curve 
relation: 
(1)  =  wt-  +  P(Dt), 
where  Dt represents  the deviation  of actual  output  or employment  from 
a unique equilibrium  value determined  by tastes and technologies and 
consistent with steady and anticipated  inflation,  and where inflation  in 
the preceding  year is a good proxy for the anticipated  rate of inflation. 
Expressions like equation 1 may be found in leading macroeconomics 
textbooks.11  The role of lagged inflation  in that equation might spring 
from  rational  expectations  in a context  where  inflation  is nearly  a random 
walk, from adaptive expectations, from long-term  nominal  wage con- 
tracting,  or from  other  forms  of nominal  inertia.  12 
While nominal  inertia  provides a compelling  explanation  for unem- 
ployment rates that remain  above the normal  equilibrium  level for the 
length of a business cycle phase, it is much less  compelling as an 
explanation  for unemployment  rates below the natural  level. The stan- 
dard  presumption  in economic theories  with rigid  prices is that  rationing 
takes place on the short side of the market:  while it makes sense to say 
that buyers cannot buy or sellers cannot sell as much as they want at 
11. See Stanley  Fischer,  RudigerDornbusch,  and  GordonR.  Sparks,  Macroeconomics 
(McGraw-Hill,  1985);  Hall and  Taylor,  Macroeconomics;  and  Robert  J. Gordon,  Macro- 
economics  (Little,  Brown, 1987). 
12. See Olivier  Blanchard,  "Why Does Money Affect Output?"  in B. Friedman  and 
F. Hahn,  eds., Handbook  of Monetary  Economics  (Amsterdam:  North-Holland,  1988). J. Bradford De Long, Lawrence H. Summers  439 
quoted prices, it makes much less sense to say that buyers and sellers 
are forced to transact  a greater  quantity  than they want. The standard 
Keynesian treatment  instead assumes that employment  is always de- 
mand  determined,  as if firms  could expand  employment  by compelling 
workers  to accept  jobs when unexpected  increases  in prices  reduce  real 
wages.  13 
The rationale  for this assumption  is rarely  made  explicit. Sometimes 
reference  is made  to contracts  entitling  employers  to force overtime  on 
workers, but it is difficult  to enforce contracts that call for people to 
work against their will, and most cyclical employment  gains take the 
form  of increases  in employment  rather  than  hours.  A second suggestion 
is that employment  rises because workers  are fooled and do not realize 
that  real  wages are  lower  in booms, but  observation  suggests  that  booms 
cause few regrets:  there  are  few complaints  after  cyclical expansions  by 
people who wish they had not been fooled into working.  In every other 
part  of economics, price rigidities  cause too little to be bought  or sold. 
Only in Keynesian macroeconomics  do wage and price rigidities  lead, 
half  the time, to quantities  in excess of their  equilibrium  level. 
The  implications  of equation  1  for  the efficacy  of demand  management 
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Macroeconomic  policies that  do not raise  or lower  the inflation  rate  over 
a period  do not affect the average  level of output  and employment  over 
that period.  14 Demand  management  policies mitigate  recessions only to 
the extent that  they choke off expansions.  Replacing  the lagged  inflation 
rate on the right-hand  side of equation 1 with a rational  expectation of 
present inflation  would generate a similar conclusion. Expectational 
mistakes  will average  out to nearly zero-you  can't fool all the people 
13. See Hall  and  Taylor,  Macroeconomics,  p. 490. "Instead  of working  as many  hours 
as they  do during  a boom ...  the public  would  be better  off with  less output  and  more  time 
to spend . ..  in recreation."  But the fact that employment  is demand  determined  keeps 
the public  from  making  this choice. 
14. In expectational  instead of accelerationist  formulations,  even policies that do 
permanently  raise the inflation  rate do not affect the average  level of output  unless they 
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all the time-and  the pattern  of policy will have no first-order  effect on 
average  production.  Even were it desirable  to increase production  on 
average,  such an increase  would not be feasible. 
Equation  2 leads immediately  to a chain of reasoning  that concludes 
that cyclical unemployment  should not be the focus of macroeconomic 
policy. Policies can do no first-order  net good or harm  on the output  side 
without  permanently  raising  or lowering  the inflation  rate. Policymakers 
could have avoided the Great  Depression-or  any other recession that 
is not  followed  by an  immediate  regime  shift-only  at  the  cost of incurring 
a higher  steady-state  level of inflation  today. Why, then, should  anyone 
care about cyclical unemployment?  Excess unemployment  incurred 
today because of policy "mistakes" allows a larger  boom tomorrow. 
The business cycle produces  welfare losses only  because consumption 
is not efficiently  smoothed  across years. 
Robert Lucas has argued that, barring  fluctuations  as great as the 
Depression, such welfare  losses will be small, might  be smaller  than  the 
losses from the choice of the wrong long-run  rate of inflation,  and will 
certainly  be far  smaller  than  the losses from  policies that  retard  long-run 
growth-as  long as the premise  that  fluctuations  leave the average  level 
of output  unaltered  is given.15 The fact that  unemployment  falls heavily 
on a few does not  justify the Keynesian  position. No matter  what  policy 
is adopted,  the same unemployment  total must  be divided  across years. 
If long-term  unemployment  is viewed as a special  problem,  it might  even 
be the case that  optimal  demand  policy requires  short, sharp  recessions 
and destabilization-it may be better to leave four people unemployed 
for six months  than  one person  unemployed  for two years-not  any  form 
of "leaning  against  the wind." 
The view that business cycles are fluctuations  about supply-deter- 
mined  trends  has placed the Keynesian  wing of American  macroecono- 
mists in a dilemma.  They take stylized equation  1 as a starting  point, but 
their  acceptance  of it traps  them  into fighting  for the low ground  in their 
running  battles with monetarists:  since demand  management  does not 
affect average employment, the key issue becomes whether demand 
affects production  for one or three periods in models where the length 
of a period is left unspecified. Concern with the avoidance of excess 
unemployment  as a principal  aim  of public  policy can be supported  only 
15. Robert  Lucas,  Models  ofBusiness Cycles  (Basil  Blackwell,  1986). J. Bradford De Long, Lawrence H. Summers  441 
by a framework  that  drops the belief that the average  is the sustainable 
level of production. 
NON-NATURAL  RATE  THEORIES 
The natural  rate hypothesis embodies the plausible  idea that econ- 
omies would always operate at a unique natural  level of employment 
and  output  but  for the effects of transitory  factors  that  cause deviations. 
In new classical  theories, these transitory  factors  are misperceptions  by 
workers  and  firms  of the level of the money  stock. In Keynesian  theories, 
it is stickiness in wages and  prices that is crucial.  Recent work suggests 
that  the conception  of economies  oscillating  around  a unique  equilibrium 
may  be inappropriate.  Instead,  an economy's natural  rate  of output  may 
be like a person's natural  state of health:  desirable,  normal-and better 
than  average. 
One alternative  to the natural  rate theory is a set of theories  that link 
cyclical fluctuations to  credit problems.'6  The old metaphor about 
"pushing  on a string"  suggests the nature  of the asymmetry  inherent  in 
the natural  rate:  banks  can  either  remain  healthy  or they  can  fail. If banks 
fail there are negative macroeconomic  ramifications,  but there is no 
corresponding  possibility on the positive side. Suppose the health of 
financial  institutions  depends  on the  discounted  value  of past  unexpected 
changes  in the collateral  value  of the assets backing  their  portfolios,  with 
the discount  factor  depending  on the ease with which banks  can rebuild 
their real capital and reserves after a shock. In this case, one would 
expect that negative  deviations  of actual  from  expected inflation  would 
have larger  quantitative  effects than  positive deviations of actual from 
expected inflation.  Stabilizing  the growth  of nominal  aggregate  demand 
would then raise the average level of output as well as reducing its 
variability.  17 
A second alternative  is provided by models with what Robert Hall 
has called "thick-market  externalities."  In these models, which can be 
based on search considerations  or on increasing  returns,  the economy 
16. See, for example, Bruce C. Greenwald  and Joseph E.  Stiglitz, "Examining 
Alternative  Macroeconomic  Theories,"  BPEA, 1:1988,  pp. 207-60. 
17. The asymmetric  impact  of nominal  shocks  is examined  below. For a formal  model 
that carries implications  along these lines, see Mark Gertler  and R. Glenn Hubbard, 
"Financial  Factors  in Business  Fluctuations"  (Columbia  University,  1988). 442  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
can settle at any one of multiple  equilibriums.  These equilibriums  often 
have the property  that the optimal  one is where the level of production 
and the rate of resource utilization are highest.18  Fully satisfactory 
theories of equilibrium  selection in models with multiple  equilibriums 
have yet to be derived.  But it is plausible  that  in the presence  of multiple 
equilibriums  purely  nominal  shocks may  have real  effects by causing  the 
economy to move between equilibriums.  In such a setting, policy can 
affect the long-run  average  level of output  and employment  if policy is 
used to shock the economy out of unfavorable  but not out of favorable 
equilibriums. 19 
Perhaps  the simplest possible model illustrating  this point is that of 
John  Bryant.20  Bryant  imagines  that  production  is so interdependent  that 
the economy's output  is determined  by the minimum  effort  put forth  by 
any worker. If increases in effort are minimally  costly and if increases 
in output  are evenly split among  workers,  then there is a multiplicity  of 
equilibriums  ranging  from one in which no one puts forth any effort to 
one of "full employment," in which everyone puts forth maximum 
effort.  Any equilibrium  is sustainable  if workers  expect it  to be sustained. 
Bryant's  model  lacks  a place  for  economic  policy, but  "  sunspot"  policies 
that were thought  to determine  expectations  would determine  expecta- 
tions and could shift  the economy from  one equilibrium  to another. 
A third alternative that introduces asymmetry is efficiency wage 
models, which also offer a reason for policy to affect the average level 
of output.21  If wages and prices are quick  to adjust  upwards  but slow to 
adjust  downwards,  unanticipated  increases in nominal  demand  will do 
little  to expand  production,  but  unanticipated  decreases  will have a large 
effect on quantities  and  a small  effect on prices. Consider  an unexpected 
increase  in money  that  starts  to reduce  unemployment  below its equilib- 
18. Robert E. Hall, "Comment,"  BPEA, 2:1988, pp. 587-91; Peter A. Diamond, 
"Aggregate  Demand  Management  in Search  Equilibrium,"  Journal  of Political  Economy, 
vol. 90 (October  1982),  pp. 881-94. 
19. For  example,  Olivier  Blanchard  and  Lawrence  H. Summers,  "Hysteresis  and  the 
European  Unemployment  Problem,"  in Stanley Fischer, ed., NBER Macroeconomics 
Annual,  1986  (MIT  Press, 1986),  pp. 15-78. 
20. John  Bryant,  "A Simple  Rational  Expectations  Keynes-Type  Model," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics,  vol. 98 (August 1983), pp. 525-28. 
21. Lawrence H. Summers, "Relative Wages, Efficiency Wages, and Keynesian 
Unemployment,"  American Economic  Review,  vol.  78 (May 1988, Papers and Proceed- 
ings, 1987), pp. 383-88. J. Bradford De Long, Lawrence H. Summers  443 
rium  level. It is obviously in the interest  of employed  workers  for firms 
to raise their wages. Efficiency  wage considerations  arising  from turn- 
over, morale, recruiting,  or effort suggest that it is in firms'  interest to 
raise wages as well. On the other hand, if there is a negative monetary 
shock, then employed workers have an incentive to fail to recognize 
what  has happened  and to resist wage reductions.  It is at least plausible 
that  those adjustments  that  are in the common  interest  of employers  and 
present employees will occur more quickly than those that are in the 
interest  only of employers. 
These considerations  all suggest that policy may affect the first as 
well as the second moment  of output.  Better  policy may  be able to fill  in 
troughs without shaving off peaks. At a minimum,  these theoretical 
arguments  suggest that the assumption  that averages are invariant  to 
demand  management  policies should  not be made  casually. 
EMPIRICAL  EVIDENCE  OF  ASYMMETRIC  RESPONSES 
That the above ideas have empirical  backing is illustrated  by the 
asymmetric  response  of the postwar  U.S. economy to monetary  shocks, 
as documented  by James  Cover.22  Examining  quarterly  U.S. data since 
1948,  he found  that  positive monetary  innovations  had  effects on output 
that were small and statistically insignificant.  By contrast, negative 
monetary innovations had large and statistically significant effects. 
Cover's point estimates are that a positive 1 percent innovation in 
monetary  growth  leads  to a cumulative  increase  in output  of 0.08 percent 
after  three  quarters,  and  that  a negative  1  percent  innovation  in monetary 
growth leads to a cumulative  decrease in output of 2.44 percent after 
three  quarters. 
Asymmetric responses to shocks hold for our annual as well as 
Cover's quarterly  data. We have examined the effect of positive and 
negative  shocks on annual  average  output,  estimating  the two following 
systems of  equations. Equations 3 and 4 decompose the previous 
December-to-December  change in the money stock into an anticipated 
component  E,  lM,  an unanticipated  shock E,, and  a negative  unantic- 
ipated  shock E,  = min(0,  E); they are estimated  both with (04 set equal 
22. James  P. Cover, "Asymmetric  Effects of Positive and Negative Money-Supply 
Shocks"  (University  of Alabama,  1988). 444  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
Table 1.  Asymmetric Responses of Annual Average Output to Nominal Shocks, 
United States, before and after World War II 
Coefficients  of ouitpiut  equiationla 
Extra  ef- 
fect of 
Atntici-  uitiatitici- 
Olutput  Output  pated  Uniatntici-  pated 
otne  vear  two years  compo-  pated  negative  Standard 
Period  earlier  earlier  Year  tnenitb  shockc  shockc  error 
System of equations  3 and 4 with  year-end-to-year-end  nomintal  motnetaty  shlocks:  coefficients  of 
equation  4 
1.  Postwar  1.11  -0.30  0.011  -2.32  0.19  1.04  0.022 
(0.15)  (0.14)  (0.003)  (0.92)  (0.32)  (0.61) 
2.  Postwar  0.95  -  0.20  0.007  ...  0.06  1.41  0.023 
(0.14)  (0.14)  (0.003)  (0.34)  (0.63) 
3.  Pre-Depression  0.49  -0.16  0.012  0.30  -  0.02  0.55  0.029 
(0.15)  (0.15)  (0.003)  (0.26)  (0.20)  (0.30) 
4.  Pre-Depression  0.53  -0.19  0.012  ...  0.02  0.48  0.029 
(0.15)  (0.15)  (0.003)  (0.19)  (0.19) 
5.  Prewar  0.78  -0.00  0.003  0.51  0.21  0.59  0.037 
(0.14)  (0.14)  (0.001)  (0.19)  (0.21)  (0.33) 
6.  Prewar  1.00  - 0.22  0.003  ...  0.19  0.59  0.040 
(0.12)  (0.12)  (0.001)  (0.22)  (0.35) 
System  of equations  5 and 6 with  year-to-year  nominal  GNP shocks: coefficients  of equationi  6 
7.  Postwar  1.33  -0.62  0.000  9.06  0.56  0.24  0.011 
(0.09)  (0.09)  (0.002)  (1.46)  (0. 1  1)  (0.20) 
8.  Postwar  0.92  -0.20  0.008  ...  0.45  0.49  0.016 
(0.09)  (0.09)  (0.002)  (0.16)  (0.28) 
9.  Pre-Depression  0.46  -  0.09  0.017  0.14  0.07  0.29  0.025 
(0.14)  (0.14)  (0.002)  (0.27)  (0.15)  (0.20) 
10.  Pre-Depression  0.49  -0.12  0.011  ...  0.11  0.23  0.025 
(0.13)  (0.13)  (0.002)  (0.13)  (0.17) 
11.  Prewar  0.99  -0.16  0.002  0.18  0.39  0.04  0.016 
(0.13)  (0.15)  (0.002)  (0.17)  (0.14)  (0.21) 
12.  Prewar  1.08  -0.28  0.002  ...  0.41  0.00  0.034 
(0.  0)  (0.  0)  (0.001)  (0.14)  (0.20) 
Source: Authors' calculations  using the Romer GNP series constructed from Christina D. Romer,  "Gross National 
Product, 1909-1928: Existing Estimates,  New  Estimates,  and New  Interpretations of World War I and Its Aftermath," 
Working Paper 2187 (NBER,  1987); Romer,  "The  Prewar Business  Cycle  Reconsidered:  New  Estimates  of Gross 
National  Product,"  Journtal of Political  Ecotnomv (forthcoming,  1989). The  Romer GNP  series  is  plotted  in figure 
A-1. Nominal  money  growth  estimates  (M2)  taken  from  Milton  Friedman  and  Anna  Jacobson  Schwartz,  A Monietati, 
History  of  the  United  States,  1867-1960  (Princeton  University  Press,  1963). Nominal  GNP  estimates  obtained  by 
multiplying  the  Romer  real  GNP  series  by  the  U.S.  GDP  deflator  of  Milton  Friedman  and  Anna  J.  Schwartz, 
Monetary  Trenids  in the United  States and Uniited  Kingdom  (University  of Chicago,  1982). 
a.  Numbers  in parentheses  are standard errors. 
b.  Anticipated  money  growth in system  of equations  3 and 4 and anticipated  nominal GNP  growth in system  of 
equations  5 and 6. 
c.  Money  growth shock  in system  of equations  3 and 4 and nominal GNP growth shock  in system  of equations  5 
and 6. J. Bradford  De Long, Lawrence  H. Summers  445 
Figure 1.  Post-World War II Relationship between Unanticipated Money 
Shocks and Output 
Real GNP growth  (percent) 
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Source: Table  1, equation 2. 
to zero) and without  the restriction  that anticipated  year-to-year  mone- 
tary  shocks should  not have real  effects. 
(3)  A\  InM, = (_A  In  lM,_  I+  (Y-2 In Yt-  I+  (Y3t  +  Et; 
(4)  In  Yt  =  , In  Yt,_ +  02 In  Yt2  +  03t  +  04Et_  A  In  Mt 
?  r35Et  +  36E-  +  qt. 
Equations  5 and 6 examine the extra effect of a negative unanticipated 
shock  E-  = min(O,  E) to nominal  GNP growth  on real  output. 
(5)  A In  (PI)t  = otl  In  (PI),  I +  0x2  In Yt,_ +  Ot3t +  Et; 
(6)  lnY,=  lnYtI+  ?  I42nY_2?+  3t+  34Et_l\In  (P)t 
35E  +  ?6E-  +  ?lt. 
Table 1 reports the results, and figure 1 plots typical values of 
unanticipated  money shocks and output responses. Taking  equation  2 
in table 1 as typical, we find that a 1 percent positive shock to last 
December's money stock leads to only a 0.06 percent increase in this 
year's output  in the postwar  period. A 1 percent  negative  innovation  in 
last December's money stock leads to a 1.47 percent decrease in this 
year's output. The coefficient on negative monetary shocks is signifi- 446  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
cantly  different  from  zero. The coefficient  on positive monetary  shocks 
is not. And the asymmetric  response to the negative  innovation  E- has a 
marginal  significance  level of 0.049  for a one-tailed  test. The asymmetry 
in responses is slightly sharper  when the requirement  that anticipated 
money growth  be neutral  is imposed  on equation  4.23 
Asymmetry  is a little stronger  before the Great Depression, and is 
even stronger  if the Great  Depression  is allowed  into the sample.  By and 
large, the results are qualitatively  similar  but weaker when this year's 
nominal  GNP  growth  rate  is the nominal  shift  variable.  The  pattern  holds 
for other  small  changes  in specification.  Asymmetry  is still  present  when 
the post-1979 period is omitted from the sample. The possibility that 
positive monetary  shocks proxy, because of the endogenous  response 
of the banking system, for supply shocks that simultaneously raise 
inflation  and the money stock and reduce output also appears to be 
without  foundation:  postwar  output  responds  asymmetrically  to shocks 
to real  balances  as well. 
Our  annual  data  thus  reveal  the same  pattern  of asymmetric  responses 
in the postwar,  prewar,  and  pre-Depression  data  that  Cover's quarterly 
data show for the postwar period. In all subperiods, expansionary 
nominal  demand  shocks appear  to have smaller  effects on U.S. output 
than  do contractionary  nominal  demand  shocks-as  would  be expected 
if credit-crunch-caused  deflations were systematically different from 
inflations,  if rationing  on the short side kept output  limited  to aggregate 
supply  in booms, or simply  if the aggregate  supply  curve  were L-shaped. 
These results suggest that the non-natural  rate theories outlined  above 
have empirical  relevance. Asymmetry  fits more naturally  into a frame- 
work  that  sees fluctuations  as lapses beneath  potential  than  into one that 
sees them  as cycles around  trend.  And if fluctuations  are lapses beneath 
potential, then appropriate  demand  management  policies can raise the 
average  level as well as reduce  the variance  of output. 
Comparing Macroeconomic  Performance 
Both theoretical  and empirical  considerations  thus suggest that the 
mean  level of output  is not given  by aggregate  supply  and  is not invariant 
23. The  only  peculiarities  in the  regressions  are  the  large  coefficients  on the anticipated 
nominal demand variables in the postwar period. These arise from the productivity J. Bradford De Long, Lawrence H. Summers  447 
to changes  in the pattern  of demand  management  policy. They provide 
little warrant  for accepting as an axiom the proposition that demand 
management  cannot  change  the average  level of resource  utilization  and 
output.  In  this  and  the  following  sections, we take  as a  working  hypothesis 
the proposition that demand management  policies have at least the 
potential to affect the average level of output, and we explore the 
implications  of this  hypothesis  by comparing  the  relative  macroeconomic 
performance  of the United States and other Western  economies before 
the Great  Depression  and since World  War  II. 
This comparison  is apt because of the dominance  from the late 1940s 
until at least the 1970s  of economic policy regimes explicitly aimed at 
stabilizing  demand  at a high level, in marked  contrast  to the regime of 
"sound finance" that had been in place earlier. The presence in the 
postwar period of Keynesian institutions and policies has attracted 
notice from prospective and retrospective observers alike.24  Deposit 
insurance  and a reinforced  commitment  by the Federal Reserve to its 
role of lender of last resort helped stabilize the banking  system. The 
growth of government spending as a share of  GNP, coupled with 
progressive taxation, gave the government  budget new weight as an 
automatic  stabilizer.  The  growth  of consumer  credit  meant  that  consumer 
durables  purchases  were likely to be less adversely affected by income 
declines.25  On top of all this came both the recognition  by governments 
that they were responsible  for preserving  high employment  and output 
and  their  commitment  to fulfill  this responsibility.26 
Whether,  and which, elements of this institutional  complex played a 
slowdown  and  the resulting  break  in the trend  growth  of output.  The estimated  coefficient 
on the anticipated  nominal  demand  variables  is proxying  for a break  in the time  trend. 
24. See Burns, "Progress  toward  Economic  Stability";  and De Long and Summers, 
"Changing  Cyclical  Variability,"  for prospective  and  retrospective  views by economists. 
For  a prospective  view by conservative  and  risk-averse  securities  analysts  who  did  believe 
that  postwar  demand  management  policies would  raise  output  on average,  see Benjamin 
Graham, David Dodd,  and Sidney  Cottle,  Security Analysis:  Principles  and Technique, 
4th  ed. (McGraw-Hill,  1962),  p. 422:  "We believe it reasonable  to adopt  a somewhat  more 
generous approach  to the valuation  of common stocks than appeared  justified in our 
previous  edition. This conclusion  is based on the assurance-not formerly  present-of 
massive  Federal  intervention  to prevent  a serious  business  depression.  This now appears 
to be a basic  tenet of both  political  parties." 
25. See De Long  and  Summers,  "Changing  Cyclical  Variability." 
26. See James  Tobin  and Murray  Weidenbaum,  eds., Two  Revolutions  in Economic 
Policy:  The First Economic  Reports  of Presidents  Kennedy  and Reagan  (MIT Press, 
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significant  role in keeping  aggregate  demand  high and stable during  the 
30 years since the end of World  War  II can be disputed.  We suspect that 
automatic  stabilizers  played a much more important  role than discre- 
tionary  fiscal  or monetary  policy.27  What  cannot  be disputed  is that  total 
nominal  demand  has been more stable since World  War  II than it was 
before the Depression. The standard  deviation  of annual  nominal  GNP 
growth  dropped  from 7.0 percent to 3.3 percent.28  Impressionistic  and 
statistical evidence both point to a reduction in the size of demand 
shocks affecting  the U.S. economy. We attribute  this reduction  in the 
volatility  of demand  to the  Keynesian  policy  regime.  Plausible  alternative 
candidates  are absent; we see little reason to believe that technology 
growth or factor prices have been subject to smaller shocks in the 
postwar  period. 
The contrast  in U.S. economic  policy before  the Depression  and  after 
World  War  II makes  it possible to assess the utility  of policies to manage 
demand. Unless Keynesian policies did improve relative macroeco- 
nomic performance  in the postwar  period, there is little reason  to argue 
for their adoption  or continuation.  A belief in the utility of Keynesian 
policies would  then be supportable  only if the postwar  period  also saw a 
striking  increase  in the natural  instability  of the economy, and  plausible 
causes of such an increase are difficult  to find. Continued  belief in the 
desirability  of demand  management  policies therefore  requires  not only 
a conviction that demand management  can affect the mean level of 
output but also a conviction that postwar Keynesian-inspired  demand 
management  has raised the mean level of output. We proceed first by 
examining  the time series properties  of output, then by assessing the 
changing  gap  between  actual  and  potential  output,  and  last  by examining 
the course of the Great  Depression. 
The Time Series Properties of Output 
We begin  our  analysis  by examining  the time series  behavior  of output 
during the pre-Depression and postwar periods for our sample of 
countries,  detailed  in the appendix,  for which long-run  national  account 
data  of acceptable  quality  exist. 
27. See De Long  and  Summers,  "Changing  Cyclical  Variability." 
28. Or  4.8 percent  with  the World  War  I period  1915-21  omitted. J. Bradford De Long, Lawrence H. Summers  449 
THE  PERSISTENCE  OF  OUTPUT 
Much  has recently  been made  of the finding,  primarily  using  postwar 
data, that  there  exists a sizable unit  root in the time series for output.  In 
autoregressive  models, coefficients on all lags of output sum to one. 
Fluctuations  in production  appear  not to die away but to persist indefi- 
nitely.29  One-we  believe incorrect-interpretation  of this finding  is that 
the presence of a sizable unit  root implies  that year-to-year  fluctuations 
are either the result of shifts in permanent  factors-like  tastes and 
technologies-or  the result  of transitory,  nominal  shocks that  neverthe- 
less have permanent  "hysteresis" effects.30  Matthew  Shapiro  and  Mark 
Watson, for example, write as if whether the univariate  process for 
output is highly persistent will determine the choice between "the 
Keynesian view, in which fluctuations  are predominantly  transitory, 
[and]. .  . the real  business cycle view, in which fluctuations  are largely 
the result  of permanent  shocks."  3' 
An alternative  interpretation  is that output  is the sum of a potential 
and a cyclical component, with the potential  component  evolving as a 
random  walk. There  is no reason  to believe that  the potential  component 
of output  tends to return  to anything  that could  be called  a deterministic 
trend. Technical  progress and capital accumulation  do not proceed at 
constant  and  deterministic  rates. 
The business cycle component of output is naturally  thought of as 
stationary  over time, as tending  to return  to some normal  level. If the 
size of the business cycle component  shrinks,  the potential  component 
may well come to dominate  the sample. The persistence of shocks will 
increase, a unit root will become more readily identifiable, and a 
29. Campbell  and Mankiw, "Are Output Fluctuations  Transitory?"  and John Y. 
Campbell  and N. Gregory  Mankiw,  "Permanent  and Transitory  Components  in Macro- 
economic  Fluctuations,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol.  77 (May  1987, Papers  and 
Proceedings,  1986),  pp. 111-17;  Charles  R. Nelson and Charles  I. Plosser, "Trends  and 
Random  Walks in Macroeconomic  Time Series: Some Evidence and Implications," 
Journal  of Monetary  Economics,  vol. 10  (September  1982),  pp. 139-62.  But see also Peter 
K. Clark,  "The Cyclical  Component  of U.S. Economic  Activity," Quarterly  Journal  of 
Economics,  vol. 102  (November  1987),  pp. 797-814;  and Mark  W. Watson,  "Univariate 
Detrending  Methods  with Stochastic  Trends,"  Jouirnal of Monetary  Economics,  vol. 18 
(July  1986),  pp. 49-75. 
30. Blanchard  and Summers,  "Hysteresis and the European  Unemployment  Prob- 
lem." 
31. Shapiro  and  Watson,  "Sources  of Business  Cycle Fluctuations." 450  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
transitory component may fail to appear in parsimonious  estimated 
models.32  We see the apparent  persistence of postwar  output as a sign 
that the postwar macroeconomic  order has performed  relatively well 
and that the business cycle has been small.33  Our confidence in this 
interpretation  is reinforced by evidence of transitory  fluctuations  in 
output before World  War II-an  era that we believe possessed much 
larger  output  gaps, and  in which output  would naturally  possess a much 
larger  transitory  business cycle component.34 
More  formally,  consider  a simple  model in which output  is composed 
of a (transitory)  gap or cycle and  a (persistent)  potential  or trend: 
(7)  g,  w +  e., 
where  gt is the current  growth  rate  of potential  output; 
(8)  Yt=  Y- I +  gt, 
where  y* is the log of potential  output; 
(9)  ct  =  pct,  I +  t,, 
where ct is a transitory  cyclical component;  and 
(10)  ln  yt = y* -  ct, 
where ln y, is the log of GNP. The change in log output  then follows a 
stationary  process: 
OC 
(11)~~  In  lyt  =  'y  +  Et  +  ,q  +  (p -  1)q E  PI.-- 
i  =  o 
Writing  output  in terms of its own past values and of shocks vt that 
cannot  be forecast  from  output's  past yields: 
32. Policy responses to unanticipated  shocks will change the persistence of the 
transitory  component  and  complicate  the story. We  have  argued  that  automatic  stabilizers 
have been the most effective Keynesian  policy devices, and so focus on the case where 
demand management  policy leaves the serial correlation  properties  of the transitory 
component  more or less unaffected. See De Long and Summers,  "Changing  Cyclical 
Variability,"  where  we also argued  that  effective automatic  stabilizers  should  reduce  the 
persistence  of shocks. We  now see that  argument  as misleading;  it fails  to note that  shocks 
to output in a univariate  context include not only business cycle but also long-run 
productivity  components. 
33. We pursue  this argument  at greater  length  in J. Bradford  De Long and Lawrence 
H. Summers,  "On the Existence of a 'Unit Root' in U.S. GNP" (Harvard  University, 
1988). 
34. Cochrane,  "How Large  Is the Random  Walk  in GNP?" J. Bradford De Long, Lawrence H. Summers  451 
(12)  lny, = (1 + p)1ny1_1 -  plny,-2  +  vt -  0vt1  +  (1 -  p)y, 
where v, is a serially  uncorrelated  shock and 0 <  1 is a parameter  that 
together  satisfy: 
(13)  (1 +  02)  Co2  =  (1 +  p2) C?  2oC2q; 




of the shock to output is permanent.  As the relative variance of the 
business cycle component decreases, the degree to which output is 
persistent-the  size of the unit root in output-increases,  and 0 drops 
from  near  one toward  zero. 
An economist trying  to decide whether  to model output  by equation 
12  or by taking  output  to be a geometric  random  walk, 
(16)  Iny,  =  lny,_-  +  y +  vt, 
might  well settle on equation  16  and  conclude  that  there  are  no transitory 
components  even when such components  contribute  the larger  share  of 
the variance. For example, suppose p  0.75, cr,=  0.02, and cr  =0.01. 
For these parameter  values, the standard  deviation  of potential  output  a 
decade in the future is a reasonable 3 percent, and the transitory 
component  c, has a standard  deviation of 3.2 percent. Then the error 
variance  from  fitting  equation  16  is only 5 percent  greater  than  the error 
variance  from fitting  equation 12. Only after  collecting a sample  of 135 
years would an economist have a 50-50  chance of rejecting  equation 16 
in  favor  ofthe alternative  equation  12  at  the  0.05  level.35  Yet the  transitory 
component  is responsible  for 83 percent  of the variance  in annual  output 
changes.  The implication  is that  a failure  of time  series techniques  to find 
transitory  fluctuations  means not that such do not exist, but only that 
they do not dominate  the data:  there are permanent  fluctuations  mixed 
35. If model selection did not give the random  walk (equation  16) the advantage  of 
being  the null  but were instead  based  on a more  balanced  goodness-of-fit  criterion  like the 
Akaike  criterion  (see H. Akaike,  "Information  Theory  and  an Extension  of the Maximum 
Likelihood  Principle,"  in  B. N. Petrov  and  F. Csaki,  eds., SecondInternationalSymposiumn 
on Information  Theory  [Akad6miai  Kiad6, 1973]),  then the crossover  point would come 
with  a shorter  sample.  The  Akaike  criterion  would  give a 50-50  chance  of choosing  the true 
model  (equation  12)  once the sample  amounted  to 90 years. 452  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
in. A change  in institutions,  or an increase  in automatic  stabilizers,  that 
reduces  the  size of the  business  cycle may  therefore  lead  to the  conclusion 
that there  is no transitory  cycle. 
The failure  to find  a transitory  cycle using postwar  data  tells us only 
that  the business cycle component  has not been dominant  in the sample 
since World  War  II, not necessarily  that  it is nonexistent.  Moreover,  the 
prewar  period shows strong signs that fluctuations  then were as a rule 
transitory;  it is possible to reject the null hypothesis that there was a 
sizable unit  root in output  before  World  War  11.36 
Table 2 regresses output on lagged output and a time trend and 
provides strong evidence against the claim that output was close to a 
random  walk before the Depression. Both the null and the alternative 
are  unbelievable  in that  no one thinks  either  that  output  is a random  walk 
or that  output  is a first-order  autoregressive  process about  a linear  trend. 
Table 2 should be thought of as an attempt to quantify  the degree to 
which output is close to a random  walk or to transitory  fluctuations 
around  a steady trend,  not as an attempt  to uncover  any true  generating 
process. 
The presence of substantial  persistence in output comes through 
clearly in the postwar sample. The coefficient on lagged output in the 
United States is large and only slightly below its expected value if 
postwar output per person of working  age really were generated  by a 
random  walk.  37 But the pre-Depression  sample  rejects  with  ease the null 
that the coefficient  on lagged  output  was one in favor of the alternative 
of first-order  autoregressive  fluctuations  about a linear  time trend. The 
same conclusions hold for other nations. In all except the United 
Kingdom, the persistence of output rises from before to after World 
War  II. 
This conclusion  is not sensitive to the yardstick  used. An alternative 
yardstick  is provided  by the n-period  variance  ratio, which is the ratio 
of  (1/n)E(y,,,,  -  yt  -  ny)2  to  E(y,  I -  y,  -  y)2,  where  E  denotes  an 
36. Considering  the past  century  as a whole, it is possible  to reject  the null  that  output 
is a random  walk in favor of the alternative  of an autoregressive  process around  a linear 
deterministic  trend. See J. Bradford  De Long and Lawrence H. Summers, "On the 
Interpretation  of a 'Unit  Root' in U.S. GNP," Working  Paper  2716  (NBER, 1988). 
37. If the null hypothesis  that  y, = Ot +  1.O(y, ,)  +  e were true, then the estimated 
coefficient  of y,  is biased and has the Dickey-Fuller  distribution  calculated  by David 
Dickey.  See Wayne A. Fuller, Introduction to Statistical  Time Series (John Wiley,  1976), 
p. 373. J. Bradford De Long, Lawrence H. Summers  453 
Table  2. Output  Persistence,  Pre-Depression  and Post-World  War  h1a 
Estimated  autoregressive 
coefficientsb 
Country  Pre-Depression  Postwar 
United States  0.419  0.816 
(0.150)  (0.081) 
Canada  0.621  0.790 
(0.125)  (0.117) 
Sweden  0.880  0.951 
(0.095)  (0.106) 
United Kingdom  0.671c  0.170 
(0.155)  (0.193) 
France  0.140c  0.792 
(0.217)  (0.139) 
Germany  0.049c  0.822 
(0.444)  (0.048) 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  using  the  Romer  series  and  data  from  Angus  Maddison,  Phases  of  Capitalist 
Development  (Oxford University  Press,  1982). 
a.  Dependent  variable is output measured as output per person  of working age for the  United  States  and output 
per capita for all other countries. 
b.  Value,  in each period,  of coefficient  on output lagged one period. 
c.  Pre-World  War 1. 
unconditional  expectation and y is the underlying  average  growth rate 
of output. The n-period  variance  ratio  is the ratio  of the variance  of the 
n-period  change  in y (yt  - Yt-  ,) to n times the variance  of the one-period 
change  in y (yt  - Yt- 1).  If the underlying  series is a random  walk, then  for 
all periods n the variance ratio will be equal to one. If the underlying 
series reverts to a deterministic  trend, the variance  ratio will approach 
zero for large periods n. The variance ratio therefore provides an 
additional  measure  of the degree to which a series is like a random  walk 
and the degree to which it exhibits mean reversion. Variance ratios 
adjusted  for small-sample  bias are reported  in table 3, and tell the same 
story  as does table 2. 
The clearly transitory  nature  of fluctuations  before World  War  II is, 
in our view, enough to remove real business cycle interpretations  of 
postwar  output  persistence from consideration.  Shapiro  and Watson's 
Keynesian-real business cycle menu is more likely a choice between 
whether  demand  management  policy was deficient  or more  satisfactory. 
Something  has reduced  the relative size of the transitory  component  in 
output,  and  the most plausible  candidate  is the reduction  of the business 
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Table 3.  International Bias-Adjusted Variance Ratios, Pre-Depression and Post-World 
War h1a 
Horizon parameter  Horizon parameter  Horizon parameter 
2  5  10  2  5  10  2  5  10 
Period  years  years  years  years  years  years  years  years  years 
United States  Sweden  Canada 
Postwar  1.15  1.02  0.87  1.37  1.26  1.28  1.00  0.98  1.30 
Pre-Depression  0.91  0.43  0.19  1.06  1.17  0.96  0.79  0.37  0.28 
United Kindgom  France  Germany 
Postwar  0.79  0.27  0.16  1.19  1.01  0.67  1.51  2.10  3.14 
Pre-Depressionb  1.19  0.82  0.59  0.77  0.41  0.36  0.99  0.49  0.34 
Source: Authors' calculations  using the Romer series and data from Maddison, Phases  of Capitalist Develop,nent. 
a.  The  n-period  variance  ratio is the  ratio of  (1In)E(yt+,  -  y,  -  n-y)2 to E(y,+I  -  y  -  -y)2,  where E denotes  an 
unconditional  expectation  and -y is the underlying average growth rate of output. 
b.  Pre-World  War 1. 
postwar era. The changing  serial correlation  pattern  of output, in the 
absence of any strong reason to suspect that the variance  of potential 
growth  has become much  more  unstable,  leads us to conclude  that  there 
has been an improvement  in macroeconomic  performance-a reduction 
in the size of transitory  components  in output-since  World  War  II. 
THE  SHAPE  OF  THE  FLUCTUATIONS  DISTRIBUTION 
Evidence on the serial correlation properties of output does  not 
establish that better policy after World  War II has raised the average 
level of output. It shows only that policy reduced the variance of the 
asymmetric  transitory  component  in output. One way of exploring  this 
issue is to examine the shape of the distribution  of output relative to 
potential before and after the war. There is some skewness in the 
distribution  of macroeconomic  variables.  Daniel  Sichel has  found, using 
quarterly  postwar U.S. data, that the distribution  of output relative to 
trend is significantly  asymmetric  in levels. Asymmetry appears espe- 
cially strong  when he conditions on the National Bureau  of Economic 
Research  business  cycle chronology  or  allows  for  flexible  long-run  trends 
by considering  the deviations of macroeconomic  variables  from cubic 
splines. Moreover,  there is significant  asymmetry  in industrial  produc- 
tion and  unemployment  rates as well as in output.38 
38. See Daniel Sichel, "Business Cycle Asymmetry:  A Deeper Look," Financial 
Research  Center  Memorandum  85  (Princeton  University,  1987).  Sichel  also finds  evidence J. Bradford De Long, Lawrence H. Summers  455 
If postwar policy filled in troughs and shaved off peaks to equal 
extents, one would  expect  to see no change  in  the shape  of the distribution 
of macroeconomic  variables.  If, on the other  hand,  policy  filled  in  troughs 
but did not shave off peaks, one would expect the shape of the output 
distribution  to change  between  the  pre-  and  postwar  periods.  The  amount 
of asymmetry should decrease. Since Salih Neft9i and De Long and 
Summers  have found that unemployment  is the U.S. macroeconomic 
variable  that  shows the most signs  of asymmetry  in the postwar  period,39 
we insure ourselves against  the danger  of choosing data guaranteed  to 
support  our hypothesis  by examining  the distribution  of pre-Depression 
and  postwar  unemployment  rates  for decreases in asymmetry. 
For prewar  unemployment  rates, we use the original  series of Leber- 
gott, the replacement  constructed  by Romer,  and  the alternative  replace- 
ment series constructed  by David Weir, who attempts  by returning  to 
original  sources to overcome the problem  of excess volatility  originally 
pointed  out by Romer.  The nature  of unemployment  rates  forces asym- 
metry  upon  them. It is easy to envision  unemployment  4 or 5 percentage 
points above average  levels; it is difficult  to envision unemployment  4 
or 5 percentage  points below average. For the pre-Depression  period, 
two of the  three  unemployment  rate  estimates  exhibit  sufficient  skewness 
to reject at the 0.05 level the null of symmetry under the maintained 
assumption that each year's unemployment rate is an independent 
normal  draw:  1.34  for the Romer  series and 1.32  for the Lebergott  series, 
although  skewness is only 0.56 for the Weir series. Figure 2 plots the 
empirical  distribution  of pre-Depression  unemployment  rates as esti- 
mated  by Weir,  Lebergott,  and  Romer.  Measured  skewness  for postwar 
annual  unemployment  rates is much less: 0.23 in the raw data, 0.20 in 
detrended data. Figure 3 plots the Romer empirical distribution  of 
postwar unemployment  rates, both raw and detrended  to allow for a 
possible upward  drift  in measured  unemployment  for a given degree of 
labor  market  tightness  in the postwar  period. 
of asymmetry  in postwar  industrial  production  data  for Canada,  France,  Japan,  and  West 
Germany,  but  not for Italy  or Great  Britain. 
39. De Long  and  Summers,  "Are  Business  Cycles  Symmetrical?"  and  Salih  N. Neftci, 
"Are  Economic  Time  Series  Asymmetric  over the Business  Cycle?"  Journal  of Political 
Economy,  vol. 92 (April  1984),  pp. 307-28. But Daniel  Sichel, "A Reconciliation  of Two 
Empirical  Views of Business Cycle Asymmetry,"  Jouirnal of Political Economy  (forth- 
coming),  argues  on the one hand  that  Neftgi's  evidence  is weaker  than  Neftgi  realizes,  and 
on the other  that  Neftgi's procedures  have relatively  little  power  to detect asymmetry. 456  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
Figure 2.  Histograms of Pre-Depression Unemployment Rates 
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Sources:  Stanley  Lebergott,  Manipower in Econiomic Growth: The Amiericani  Record  sinice 1800 (McGraw-Hill, 
1964); Christina Romer,  "Spurious  Volatility in Historical  Unemployment  Data."  Journial ofPolitical  Econionii', vol. 
94 (February  1986), pp. 1-37; and David Weir, "Unemployment  Volatility: A Sensitivity  Analysis"  (Yale  University, 
1986). J. Bradford De Long, Lawrence H. Summers  457 
Figure 3.  Histograms of Post-World War II Unemployment Rates 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  from post-World War 11 unemployment  data in Romer,  "Spurious  Volatility." 
The decrease in skewness of unemployment  rates between the pre- 
Depression  and  postwar  periods  suggests  that  the reduction  in transitory 
output  variability  since World  War  II comes disproportionately  from a 
reduction  in the depth  of troughs  rather  than the height  of peaks. In the 
next section we attempt  to measure  the postwar  decrease  in the average 
gap  between actual  and potential  output. 
Measuring  Output Gaps 
If output  evolved according  to the same stochastic  process in the pre- 
Depression  and  postwar  periods,  it would  be a simple  matter  to compare 458  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
performance.  Any comparison  of the variance  of innovations,  or changes, 
or deviations  about  trend  would  give the same  answer.  But  because  both 
the serial  correlation  properties  of output  and  the shape  of  the distribution 
have changed,  the choice of a metric  for assessing  performance  matters. 
Previous  work  has concentrated  on the variability  of output,  which will 
be inappropriate  if-as  we have argued  throughout-demand manage- 
ment  policy affects the average  level as well as the variance  of output. 
In this section  we therefore  revert  to a traditional  Keynesian  approach 
to the evaluation  of performance.  We compare  the average  level of the 
gap between actual output and potential. We use the economy's peak 
level of performance  to assess potential. 
More specifically, we use a simple  judgment-free  approach  to con- 
struct a family of potential series. Our approach  is motivated  by four 
assumptions: 
-First,  potential  productivity  should  not decline  over time. Workers 
and  managers  do not forget  production  processes. 
-Second,  actual output is never above potential, except perhaps 
during  total war. 
-Third,  potential  output  grows smoothly. New technologies, tech- 
niques, and organizations  diffuse slowly throughout  the economy,40  as 
do changes  in natural  resources,  machines,  workers,  and  tastes for work 
and leisure. Since the determinants  of  potential change smoothly, 
potential  itself should  grow smoothly  as well. 
-Fourth,  actual  output  does attain  potential  on a semi-regular  basis. 
Shocks that reduce output  below potential  are likely to be damped  out 
in a few years. 
One could quarrel  with these assumptions,  but the requirement  that 
output  attain  potential  is close to a definition,  and  any  claim  that  potential 
does not grow smoothly  because of technology  shocks  jagged  on a year- 
to-year scale is inconsistent with the picture of technology held by 
economists  who have analyzed  technical  change.41  The assumption  that 
potential  does not fall is the most vulnerable,  for what is an oil or any 
other negative terms-of-trade  shock but a fall in potential?  Productive 
activities that  had generated  surplus  at previous  prices no longer  do so. 
40.  See David Landes, The UnboundPrometheus  (Cambridge University Press, 1967); 
Alfred Chandler, The Visible Hand (Harvard University Press,  1978). 
41.  Joseph A. Schumpeter, Business  Cycles:A  Theoretical, Historical,  and Statistical 
Analysis  of the Capitalist Process  (McGraw-Hill,  1939); Simon Kuznets,  Modern Eco- 
nomic  Growth: Rate,  Structure,  and  Spread  (Yale  University  Press,  1966); Nathan 
Rosenberg,  Technology and American Economic  Growth (Sharpe, 1972). J. Bradford De Long, Lawrence H. Summers  459 
The assumption  requires  the further  assumption  that supply  shocks like 
the oil shock of 1973  are rare  and  their  effects small. 
The assumption  that output  is never above potential  except perhaps 
during  total war is defensible. When employment  is high, scarce fixed 
capital  is intensively  used, learning-by-doing  proceeds at a rapid  pace, 
and unemployment  rates for marginal  groups  in the labor  force drop  to 
levels not much  worse than  the core labor  force suffers  at business cycle 
troughs. It is difficult to believe that the inefficiencies of too rapid 
depreciation  or too small  inventories  of unemployed  labor  are the same 
order  as these benefits  of a high-pressure  economy. 
The assumption  that  the economy comes close to potential  on a semi- 
regular basis is  more vulnerable. It amounts to  assuming that the 
fluctuations  of interest to macroeconomics are those that have the 
duration  of the Burns-Mitchell  business cycle.42  The persistence of the 
Great  Depression, and of high unemployment  in Europe in the 1980s, 
indicates that this assumption  can be unwise. Indeed, our omission of 
the 1980s from the sample for this section for European nations is 
predicated  on our inability  to construct  estimates of potential  over the 
past decade that we regard  as reasonable.  We think, however, that the 
assumption  is justified  for studying  the United States in the pre-Depres- 
sion  and  postwar  periods  and  for studying  European  nations  in  the period 
before  the Depression  or World  War  I and  after  World  War  II before  the 
onset of the recent European  depression. 
The four assumptions  inspire  the following  judgment-free  approach 
for constructing  potential  output  series. Letting  y* denote potential  and 
y denote actual  output  per  person of working  age, we construct  a family 
of potential  series indexed  by k using  the following  recursive  procedure: 
(17)  Y,*+i  =  ~y*  +  max  0,  max  {  Y 
ti=l  tok  k 
The  growth  rate  of potential  between year t and  year t +  1  lies along  the 
straight  line  with  the steepest  slope  that  connects  the  estimate  of potential 
in year  t with actual  output  per  person  of working  age in any of the years 
t +  1 through  t +  k. The assumption  that potential  growth  is smooth 
implies  that the rate of growth  from year t to t +  1 will be close to the 
rate  of growth  from  t to t + k. The assumption  that  actual  is never  above 
potential  output  requires  that  potential  between t and  t + k grow  at least 
42. Arthur  F. Burns  and Wesley C. Mitchell,  Measuring  Business Cycles (Columbia 
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Figure 4.  Peak-to-Peak Potential Output per Working-age Adult, 
United States, 1890-1930a 
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Source:  Authors' calculations  using the Romer series.  See  equation  17. 
a.  Potential GNP in each  year based on constructions  using GNP of five future periods. 
rapidly enough to keep potential at or above actual output. And the 
assumption  that actual  attains  potential  on a semi-regular  basis implies 
that for some year between t and t +  k actual output is quite close to 
potential. Different values of the horizon parameter  k correspond  to 
different beliefs about the smoothness of potential growth and the 
frequency  with  which  actual  output  draws  near  to potential.  We  examine 
a family of constructed  gap series, allowing  the horizon  parameter  k to 
vary between three  and  eight years. 
The  gap  series  generated  are  independent  of the average  rate  of growth 
of output in the absence of persistent multiyear  output declines. But 
constructed  potential output series may well lie below true potential, 
and estimated average output gaps may be smaller  than true average 
gaps. The average  gap measures  here should, therefore,  be viewed as 
statistics descriptive of the sample, not as estimates of parameters  of 
underlying  generating  processes. 
CONSTRUCTED  POTENTIAL  AND  OUTPUT  GAP  SERIES 
Generating  series for potential output and the output gap for the 
United States confirms  the conclusions about the declining size of the J. Bradford De Long, Lawrence H. Summers  461 
Figure 5.  Peak-to-Peak Potential Output per Working-age Adult, 
United States, 1950199Oa 
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Source: Authors'  calculations  using the Romer series. 
a.  Potential GNP in each  year based on constructions  using GNP of five future periods. 
U.S. business cycle inferred  from  the changing  serial  correlation  pattern 
of output.  For all of the different  values of the horizon  parameter  k used 
in constructing  potential, the mean output gap is at least 50 percent 
greater  before the Depression  than after World  War  II. Figures  4 and 5 
present  constructed  potential  based  on the Romer  estimated  GNP series 
for k =  5 in both the pre-Depression  and postwar periods. Table 4 
presents average gaps for a wide range of horizons k and standard 
deviations of output from quadratic  trends for the Romer series. The 
mean gap is about 50 percent larger  in the pre-Depression  than in the 
postwar  period;  the macroeconomic  slack relative  to the economy was 
some 50 percent  greater  before the advent of Keynesian demand  man- 
agement  policies. 
The difference  in mean output  gaps suggests that the United States 
has on average  come 1 percent of production  closer to potential  output 
since World  War II than it did before the Depression-a  gain that, if 
sustained, would now run at almost $50 billion a year. Since this 
improvement  in performance  is to a first  approximation  a simple  increase 
in capacity  utilization,  it is almost all a pure welfare  gain. If there is an 
association  between  a high-pressure  economy on the one hand  and  rapid 
growth  of potential productivity  on the other, then the benefits from 462  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
Table 4.  Peak-to-Peak Average Output Gaps, United States, Pre-Depression and 
Post-World  War II 
Percent 
Standard  Standard 
deviation  deviation 
Horizon  parametera  Of  output  changes 
Period  3 years  5 years  8 years  trend  in output 
Postwar  1.6  2.3  2.8  2.9  2.6 
Pre-Depression  2.6  3.5  4.3  3.4  3.8 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  using the Romer series.  See equation  17. 
a.  Number of future periods used in the construction  of potential. 
improved macroeconomic performance  may be substantially  under- 
stated. 
The superiority  in estimated  performance  of the postwar  period  in the 
United States does not come equally from all postwar decades. The 
improvement  stems largely from reasonably  good performance  in the 
1950s  and excellent performance  in the 1960s. Pre-Depression  average 
gaps are not 50 percent  but 100  percent  larger  than  gaps during  the first 
half of the postwar  period, and the difference  between pre-Depression 
and  post-1970  average  gaps is only 30 percent. 
Such a difference  in the size of the average  gap is striking  given the 
near-equality  of the volatility-based  estimates  of business  cycle size, the 
standard  deviations of levels about quadratic  trends, also reported  in 
table 4.43  In light of the changing  persistence properties  of output and 
the large reduction in the mean constructed output gap, we read the 
near-equality  of the standard  deviations  of output  from  trend  as suggest- 
ing that  volatility  measures  have been corrupted  by noise introduced  by 
the stochastic  nature  of long-run  potential  output  growth.  The substantial 
reduction  in the volatility of year-to-year  changes in output reinforces 
43. The standard  deviations  of growth  rates show considerable  stabilization,  falling 
from  3.8 percent  before  the Depression  to 2.6 percent  after  World  War  II. This disparity 
in the movement  of the variance  of levels and  differences  is a consequence  of the  changing 
serial correlation  properties  of output. Output  could become more persistent and yet 
remain  as variable  about trends  only if the variability  of changes were to decline. In a 
cyclical variability  metric,  cycles have become longer  and less jagged-but  not smaller. 
We find  it difficult  to argue  that such a decline in the variability  of annual  output  growth 
rates  per  se is a plus  for economic  welfare. J. Bradford De Long, Lawrence H. Summers  463 
Table 5.  International Output Gaps, Pre-Depression and Post-World  War II 
Percent 
Horizon  parametera  Horizon  parametera  Horizon  parametera 
3  5  8  3  5  8  3  5  8 
Period  years  years  years  years  years  years  years  years  years 
United  Kingdom  France  Germany 
Postwar  1.1  1.6  1.9  0.7  0.1  0.1  1.2  1.6  1.9 
Pre-Depressionb  1.9  2.6  0.3  1.9  2.6  2.8  1.1  1.5  1.9 
Sweden  Canada 
Postwar  1.0  1.5  1.8  1.2  2.1  2.5 
Pre-Depression  2.2  2.7  3.1  5.0  5.7  6.5 
Source: Authors'  calculations  using data from Maddison,  Phases  of Capitalist Developmient.  See  equation  17. 
a.  Number of future periods  used in the construction  of potential. 
b.  Pre-World  War 1. 
our  belief that the small  reduction  in volatility  about  trend  from  the pre- 
Depression  to the postwar  period  springs  from  noise introduced  into this 
variability  measure  by persistent  shifts in stochastic potential  growth. 
Examining  the long-run  business  cycle performance  of other  Western 
economies  by and  large  confirms  the conclusions  we have reached  from 
our  examination  of the United States. As tables 2 and 3 show, in four of 
the five other nations the postwar period has seen an increase in the 
persistence of output fluctuations,  suggesting  a decline in the relative 
magnitude  of the transitory  business cycle component  of output. Simi- 
larly, as table 5 shows, in four of the five nations postwar output gaps 
are noticeably  reduced. 
That measures of volatility about trend in the United States stand 
alone  in  opposition  to other  pieces of evidence-the  changing  persistence 
properties  of output, the substantial  reduction in business cycle size 
when calculated  in a gap metric, and the similar  increase in persistence 
and  reduction  in business cycle size for other  countries-casts  doubt  on 
the validity  of conclusions that spring  from  comparisons  of U.S. output 
volatility  about trends. Since the revisionist interpretation  of relative 
macroeconomic  performance  carried  out by Romer  depends  in substan- 
tial part  on the use of volatility as a proxy for performance,  we see no 
reason  to depart  from  our  belief that  the postwar  period  has seen a large 
improvement  in macroeconomic  performance. 
The  difference  between  the conclusions  about  the relative  sizes of the 464  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
pre-Depression  and postwar  business cycle that emerge  from Romer's 
comparisons  of volatility  and  from  our  comparisons  of gaps  demonstrates 
that  whether  one believes that  business cycles are lapses from  potential 
output or cycles around  trend output makes a difference not only for 
whether  one thinks  that  policy  can significantly  improve  macroeconomic 
performance  but also for whether one thinks that different  eras have 
seen significantly  different  levels of macroeconomic  performance.  Cycle- 
based  measures  produce  little  warrant  for  believing  that  the Romer  series 
shows that U.S.  macroeconomic performance  has been significantly 
better  since World  War  II than  it was before  the Depression.  By contrast, 
gap-based  measures support  the claim that the postwar U.S. economy 
has-for  Keynesian  or other reasons-achieved  superior  performance. 
That  the gap-based  measures  mesh with the conclusions implied  by the 
serial  correlation  properties  of output  reinforces  what  we see as a strong 
a priori  case for gap-based  measures. 
OKUN'S  LAW 
Additional  empirical  evidence exists that  the gap  approach  is superior 
to the cycle approach.  Okun's  Law appears  stronger  in a gap- than in a 
cycle-based  framework,  and  the distribution  of constructed  output  gaps 
appears  skew in a way that would be expected if the generating  process 
were of the gaps type but is hard  to rationalize  if it were of the cycles 
type. These considerations,  however, are weak. They may give some 
added  confidence  to a reader  already  sympathetic  to this approach;  they 
will not  convince  those with  a strong  prior  commitment  to the  proposition 
that  demand  management  policies do not affect output  on average. 
Fluctuations  in the unemployment  rate are an alternative  gauge of 
business cycle fluctuations.  To the extent that gaps or cycles really are 
measures of business cycle  components of output, they should be 
correlated  with fluctuations  in the unemployment  rate. A higher  corre- 
lation of gap than cycle measures with unemployment  would suggest 
that the constructed  output  gaps were a better measure  of the business 
cycle than  the constructed  cycle measures.  Indeed,  a number  of possible 
unemployment rates appear to be more highly correlated with the 
constructed  output  gap than  with measures  of cycles around  trend. 
The first  part  of table 6 compares  how the constructed  gap (k =  5) as 
a predictor  of unemployment  fares vis-'a-vis  output itself and a time J. Bradford De Long, Lawrence H. Summers  465 
Table  6. Regressions  of Unemployment  on the Output  Gap 
and on Alternative  Measures  of the Cyclea 
Standard 
Unemployment  Output  Cycle  error  of 
series  gap  measure  Time  Rho  estimate 
Cycle measure:  deviation  of output  from trend 
Weir  - 0.564  0.011  -0.036  0.66  1.04 
(0.059)  (0.033)  (0.057)  (0.12) 
Lebergott  - 0.846  0.112  -0.191  0.92  1.85 
(0.092)  (0.055)  (0.096)  (0.07) 
Romer  -0.570  0.043  0.038  0.89  1.35 
(0.077)  (0.025)  (0.074)  (0.11) 
Cycle measure:  deviation  of output  from a nine-year  moving  average 
Weir  - 0.543  - 0.042  -0.013  0.65  1.02 
(0.095)  (0.072)  (0.004)  (0.13) 
Lebergott  - 0.676  -0.071  0.005  0.87  1.63 
(0.151)  (0.115)  (0.007)  (0.11) 
Romer  -0.521  -0.016  - 0.000  0.91  1.34 
(0.124)  (0.094)  (0.006)  (0.07) 
Cycle measure:  deviation  of output  from an exponentially  smoothed  trend 
Weir  -0.621  0.133  -0.021  0.828  0.94 
(0.069)  (0.085)  (0.004)  (0.11) 
Lebergott  -0.738  -0.130  -0.005  0.95  1.59 
(0.116)  (0.143)  (0.007)  (0.108) 
Romer  - 0.617  0.209  -0.010  0.98  1.07 
(0.079)  (0.097)  (0.005)  (0.07) 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  using unemployment  data from Christina Romer,  "Spurious  Volatility  in Historical 
Unemployment  Data," Journal of Political Economy,  vol. 94 (February 1986), pp. 1-37; David Weir, "Unemployment 
Volatility: A Sensitivity  Analysis"  (Yale University,  1986); Stanley  Lebergott,  Manapower  in Economic  Growth: The 
Americatn Record  since  1800 (McGraw-Hill,  1964); and using the Romer series  for output. 
a.  Entire pre-Depression  and postwar sample. 
trend.  If the proper  measure  of the state of the business cycle is indeed 
the deviation  of output  from a near-deterministic  trend, the output  gap 
measure should add no additional  explanatory  power. Yet the output 
gap  is a better  predictor  of unemployment. 
This result might  arise simply  from the fact that our potential  series 
captures  a relatively  flexible trend. Perhaps  cycle measures, if allowed 
a similarly  flexible trend, would also perform  as well as predictors  of 
unemployment.  While  we would not be surprised  to learn  that  there is a 
method of estimating  an average trend that does generate a business 
cycle series as highly  correlated  with unemployment  as the constructed 
gap, to date we have not found such a method. We have used as cycle 
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from exponentially smoothed output (with a smoothing coefficient K 
equal to 0.7 that leads to a better fit than the other trend  series tried to 
date), and from a trend series constructed using the nonlinear  filter 
proposed  by Robert  Hodrick  and Edward  Prescott.44  The gap appears  a 
better  predictor  of the  unemployment  rate  than  the cycle-based  measures 
for all three  of these proposed  flexible  average  trends. 
According  to the cycle-trend  approach,  all years should  carry  approx- 
imately  equal  amounts  of information  as to what the sustainable  level of 
production  is. In the potential-gap  approach, only peak years carry 
information  about  the sustainable  level of production.  The fact that  gap- 
based measures  outperform  cycle-based measures  in predicting  unem- 
ployment suggests that peak years do carry more information  about 
what the sustainable  level of output  is than  do average  years. 
The Great Depression 
So far we have dealt with the pre-Depression  and postwar periods 
only and have left the Great Depression to one side. In so doing, we 
have not considered  the episode that argues  most powerfully  both that 
output fluctuations  are transitory  and that the average level of output 
cannot be identified  with any supply-driven  trend. The Depression is 
hard  to reconcile  with the view that  the average  level of output  over time 
reveals  what  the sustainable  level of output  is, for it is next to impossible 
to make sense of U.S. long-run  growth  without  assuming  that the 1929 
peak carries  a lot more  information  about  what the productive  capacity 
of the economy  was than  does the 1933  trough.  It is impossible  to imagine 
an episode that would push output as much above, as the Depression 
pushed  it below, its average  level. The Depression,  by its very existence, 
makes it impossible to argue that fluctuations  around averages are 
symmetrical. 
44. Robert Hodrick and Edward Prescott, "Post-War  U.S.  Business Cycles: An 
Empirical  Investigation"  (Carnegie-Mellon  University,  1980).  The  filtered  series  is affected 
by the treatment  of the endpoints  1889,  1929,  1950,  and 1987.  We  anchor  the filtered  trend 
to actual  output  at  the  endpoints.  The  smoothed  series  thus  does not "see" the  approaching 
Depression.  If trend  did  see the Depression  in advance,  the cycle would  be a bad  predictor 
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MEAN  REVERSION  AND  THE  GREAT  DEPRESSION 
Examination  of the Great  Depression  reinforces  the belief that  output 
shocks before  World  War  II were transitory.  It also reinforces  the belief 
that the economy may possess multiple  levels of production  that are 
equilibriums  in the sense that  the forces pushing  output  back  to potential 
are weak. Finally, it provides little support  for the position that "the 
time path  to equilibrium  shapes . . . equilibrium.  " 45 
The output decline of the Great Depression was not permanent. 
Output  did  recover.  The  log of output  per  person  of working  age declined 
by 0.383-0.455  relative  to the 1889-1929  trend-between 1929  and 1933. 
But between 1933  and 1941  the log of output  per person of working  age 
grew by 0.529-0.384  more than the trend. By the time World  War lI 
began  and the government  began  to exert command  over the economy, 
more than five-sixths of the Depression decline in output relative to 
trend  had  been made  up. It is hard  to attribute  any of the pre-  1942  catch- 
up of the economy to the war. Neither the federal government's  fiscal 
deficit  nor the surplus  on trade  account  became an appreciable  share  of 
national  product  before  Pearl  Harbor.46 
Figure  6 plots the path  of output  per  person  of working  age before  and 
during  the Great  Depression. For reference  three trend  lines are given. 
The 1906-29  trend  line is the upper  linear  envelope of the points  attained 
before the Great Depression. The 1892-1929 trend line is meant to 
capture  the long-run  average  growth  rate  of output  per  person  of working 
age. And  the 1919-29  trend  line is meant  to capture  any post-World  War 
I acceleration in productivity  growth. All three trend lines fall close 
together.  All agree  that the degree to which output  had recovered  from 
its Depression  depths  even before  the United States entered  World  War 
II was substantial. 
The substantial  degree of mean reversion by 1941  is evidence that 
shocks  to output  are transitory.  Suppose  we grant  that  World  War  II did 
not have any significant  effect on the U.S. economy until after Pearl 
Harbor,  and assume for the moment  that U.S. production  really was a 
45.  Edmund  S. Phelps,  Inflation Policy and Unemployment Theory: The Cost-Benefit 
Approach to Monetary Planning (Macmillan,  1972),  pp. 77-78. 
46. Government  spending  also fails to rise as a proportion  of GNP between 1938  and 
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Figure 6.  U.S. Recovery from the Great Depression Measured Against 
Different Trend Lines, 1890-1950 
Log  of output  per  working-age  adult 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  using Romer series. 
random  walk:  that  a 1  percent  surprise  decline  in output  led to a 1  percent 
downward  revision of one's estimate of production  in the far future. 
Then the decline and subsequent  rapid  recovery of the 1929-41 period 
are orders of magnitude more unlikely than even a decline of the 
magnitude  of the Depression  itself. 
Calculating  the probability  of a Great Depression under the null 
hypothesis that output  follows a random  walk-a  45.5 percent decline 
in output  followed by a 38.4 percent  recovery relative  to previous drift 
within a 12-year  period-is  straightforward.47  But such a calculation 
overstates  the evidence against  a random  walk. Because the contraction 
was itself unlikely,  we divide the probability  of such a large  decline and 
recovery by the probability  of observing the decline itself. This prob- 
ability  is reported  in table  7 for three  different  estimates  of the standard 
deviation of year-to-year  changes in output. It indicates how likely it 
would be, under  the random  walk hypothesis, for output  to recover to 
at least 1941  levels given that it declined  to at least 1933  levels. The low 
probabilities  of such a recovery  argue  against  the random  walk hypoth- 
esis and so favor  a model  with mean  reversion.48 
47.  J. Michael Harrison, Brownian Motion and Stochastic Flow Systems (Wiley, 1985). 
48. The autocorrelations  of the annual  time  series  for 1929-39  are  different  from  those 
of the rest of the prewar  period.  If the same autocorrelations  did prevail,  the Depression J. Bradford De Long, Lawrence H. Summers  469 
Table 7.  Probability of Depression and Recovery If Output Follows a Random Walk 
Probability  of 
Standard  recovery  given 
deviation  of  decline 
Sample  period  GNP changes  (percent) 
1919-39  7.1  1.06 
1889-1933  5.3  0.04 
Pre-Depression  3.7  2 x  10-5 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  using  Romer  series.  The  probabilities  shown  are the  probability of a decline  and 
recovery  as least as great as occurred,  divided by the probability of a decline  as great as occurred,  all under the null 
hypothesis  that output follows  a random walk. 
Full recovery from the Great  Depression weighs strongly  in favor of 
multiple-equilibrium  as opposed  to hysteresis  alternatives  to the natural 
rate hypothesis. Models in which the economy can fall into a low- 
production,  low-activity  state and  remain  there  for considerable  periods 
of time  with  no noticeable  tendency  to return  to equilibrium  are  consistent 
with the Depression. Models in which falls in output and increases in 
unemployment  themselves have strong effects on the natural  rate of 
unemployment  and natural  level of output  are not. The Depression  as a 
whole does not seem to have reduced materially  the long-run  growth 
path  of the U.S. economy. 
Full recovery from the Depression is particularly  striking  given that 
so many  of the mechanisms  that  economists  rely  on to produce  hysteresis 
were at work during the Depression. Net capital formation  was nil: 
reproducible  tangible  assets in 1939  had  the same real  value as in 1929.49 
Labor  force growth slowed: one aim of the Social Security  program  as 
instituted  was to provide  incentives for workers  to retire  and so reduce 
excess supply  in  the  labor  market.  In  this  aim  the  program  was successful. 
Labor force participation  among men 65 or older, which had drifted 
downward  from 68 percent to 55 percent between 1890  and 1930, had 
dropped  to 41 percent by the 1940  census and continued  to fall there- 
after.50  The  failure  of hysteresis  effects to emerge  on the aggregate  supply 
side as a result of the Depression suggests that it is appropriate  to view 
would  have  been over by 1935:  no other  business  cycle lasted  for more  than  six years. But 
this is an argument  for the line of research  followed by Stock that allows each business 
cycle to evolve on its own time  scale, not for any conclusion  that  declines  in output  are in 
general  permanent.  See James Stock, "Measuring  Business Cycle Time," Journal of 
Political  Economy,  vol. 95 (December  1987),  pp. 1240-61. 
49.  Historical Statistics,  p. 256. 
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the economy in general  not as a system in which the path  to equilibrium 
affects the position of equilibrium  but as a system with multiple  short- 
run  equilibrium  positions. 
Conclusions 
To sum up, we reiterate  our four principal  conclusions. First, the 
failure of time series analysis to find strong evidence of a transitory 
business cycle in the postwar  U.S. economy is an argument  that recent 
macroeconomic  performance  has been good. Before World  War  II, no 
one doubts  that  production  contained  transitory  business cycle compo- 
nents. The Great  Depression  alone  provides  sufficient  evidence to reject 
the claim that the canonical shock to production  is a permanent  one. 
Changes  in potential  output are presumably  permanent  and persistent, 
while changes  in the output  gap  are  likely  to be ephemeral  and  transitory. 
A reduction  in output  gaps will change the serial  correlation  properties 
of output  and  may  leave time  series  analysis  unable  to identify  a transitory 
component. The lack of a transitory  component  in output since World 
War  II-the  finding  that the canonical  shock to production  is persistent 
in a univariate  context-suggests  that performance  has been good, that 
shocks that  would  otherwise  have  produced  severe business  cycles have 
been damped  by a robust  economic structure  or by skillfully  conducted 
policy, and that Romer's  findings  of little improvement  in performance 
arise  because her  measures  of variability  about  trends  are contaminated 
by long-run  shifts in the stochastic  rate  of growth  of potential  output. 
Second, assessing performance  by gaps establishes  a sizable relative 
improvement  in performance  since World War II. The significance  of 
this improvement had been cast into doubt by  Romer's improved 
estimates  of macroeconomic  aggregates,  which  show  only  a small  decline 
in  volatility  between  pre-Depression  and  postwar  periods.  Romer's  work 
greatly  reduces  the apparent  size of pre-Depression  business cycles, but 
its most extreme interpretation-that there has been no significant 
decline  in  the  business  cycle between  the  pre-Depression  and  the  postwar 
period-does  not survive the removal of the assumption  that demand 
management  cannot affect average output levels and its corollary  that 
volatility is an adequate measure of performance.  Similarly, Lucas's 
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rests on the assumption  that successful policies cannot  raise means but 
only reduce  variances,  and also does not survive  the shift  from  a gap-  to 
a cycle-based  analytical  framework. 
Third,  there is some theoretical  and empirical  evidence that weighs 
on the side of gap-  as opposed to cycle-based  decompositions  of output. 
Okun's Law is more of a law if output benchmarks  are gap-based 
measures  of potential  instead  of cycle-based  measures  of average  trend. 
Business cycle asymmetry  fits much more easily into a framework  in 
which  fluctuations  are  lapses  from  full  employment  than  into  aframework 
in which they are cycles about  trends. Moreover,  present-day  microec- 
onomic foundations are to some degree more in sympathy with ap- 
proaches  based on gaps than  on cycles: there are plausible  mechanisms 
for generating  fluctuations  that necessarily cause lapses from full em- 
ployment  rather  than  cycles about  trend. 
Fourth,  the most important  feature  of the Great  Depression  is that it 
appears  to have had  few effects on the long-run  growth  path  of the U.S. 
economy. We read this as a sign that the metaphor  of hysteresis as 
applied  to economies should be understood  as asserting  not that there 
are no tendencies after demand shocks for the self-regulating  mecha- 
nisms of the economy to push unemployment  down and output  back to 
trend  levels, but that there is likely to be a wide range  over which the 
self-regulating  mechanisms  prove to be weak. 
Lucas's and Romer's arguments both carry the implication that 
Keynesian  economics, as practiced  in the  postwar  period,  may  well have 
had  no significant  positive real  effects on economic welfare.  The core of 
Lucas's argument is  that because Keynesian demand management 
cannot  affect  means, it cannot  have large  welfare  effects. An implication 
of Romer's  research  is that if Keynesian  demand  management  does not 
affect  means  but  only volatility  about  trends,  then  it has not had  positive 
welfare  effects in the postwar  period.  The natural  next step to take  along 
this line of argument-a  step explicitly taken by Lucas but not by 
Romer-is that  the unemployment  rate  should  not be an  explicit  concern 
of macroeconomic  policy. It is plausible  to argue  that policies aimed  at 
filling  in troughs  might  impart  to the economy an inflationary  bias that 
may well have costs. If that is so and if demand  management  policies 
cannot provide significant and have not provided positive welfare 
benefits,  macroeconomic  policy should ignore indicators  of economic 
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more  than  provide  a stable  and  predictable  environment  in  which  private 
agents can make their  economic decisions, and should  leave the unem- 
ployment  rate  to find  its own natural  level. 
This line of argument  is compelling  if one accepts the premise that 
demand  management  policies affect not means but only variances. But 
we see no reason to have confidence  in the correctness of this largely 
unexamined  underlying  premise. If the fundamental  premise that fluc- 
tuations  are  cycles about  means  is replaced  by the alternative  premise- 
which  we find  at least as plausible-that fluctuations  are  primarily  lapses 
beneath sustainable  levels of production, then the evidence suggests 
that largely successful efforts to manage demand have significantly 
increased average output and reduced average unemployment  since 
World  War  II. 
Moreover, the bias toward inflation  contained in postwar demand 
management  policies seems to us relatively  small. It is unlikely  that the 
sharp  contractions  of the prewar  period had substantial  inflation  divi- 
dends. We see no sign that booms reached  higher  peaks before World 
War II because the ever-present  danger  of deep depression made the 
absence of such contractions  a large expansionary  surprise.  And that 
inflation  is less than  5 percent  today  tells us that  the significant  reductions 
in the average  output  gap since World  War  II have not been attained  at 
the price of a secular  upward  drift  in average  inflation. 
The policy implication  seems to us to be to stay the course, to keep 
the unemployment  rate  an explicit object of policy concern  and to keep 
trying to relieve depressions without damping out expansions. The 
monetarist  policy that the unemployment  rate should  be left to seek its 
own level would appear desirable only to an economist dogmatically 
committed  to the belief that  demand  management  cannot  affect means. 
Keynesian  demand  management  policies promise  substantial  benefits  if 
the gap view fits the world; they carry  relatively  few costs if the cycle 
view is correct. 
This  implication  is reinforced  by the presence  of some theoretical  and 
empirical  support  for the gap as opposed to the cycle view. Fluctuation- 
generating  mechanisms  like those invoked  by credit-collapse  theories  of 
the business cycle produce depressions but not unsustainable  booms. 
Asymmetry  in output  and  the superior  performance  of Okun's  Law in a 
gap  framework  suggest  that  fluctuations  are  lapses from  potential  rather 
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This implication  is also reinforced  by the bad experiences that have 
resulted or would have resulted from concentrating  macroeconomic 
policy on maintaining  sound  finance  by following  simple  policy rules  and 
allowing the unemployment  rate to find its own level. In Europe, the 
highly contractionary  demand  management  policies of the early 1980s 
have left a legacy of higher  unemployment  and lower output that has 
lasted far longer  than any believer in the natural  rate hypothesis  would 
have predicted  and than advocates of such policies implicitly  promised 
a decade ago.5"  In the United States, there is a near consensus that the 
monetarist  policy advocated  over 1982-84  of continuing  to reduce and 
stabilize the rate of growth of the money stock and ignoring  the then- 
high unemployment  rate would have been a disaster.52  And the Great 
Depression  itselfis interpreted  by Milton  Friedman  and  AnnaJ.  Schwartz 
as the result of the Federal  Reserve's pursuit  of policies then regarded 
as sound  finance  by refusing  to inflate  radically  the high-powered  money 
stock.53  It may well be that  it is Keynesian  demand  management  and  its 
attempt  to stabilize demand'and  employment  at a high level that truly 
provides the most stable environment  in which private investors and 
producers  can make  their  economic plans. 
The question of whether Keynesian demand management  should 
continue in the United States turns on whether such policies have 
achieved significant  real output gains over the past 40 years. We note 
that  the United States has suffered  only one postwar  recession-that  of 
1982-as  severe as those common before the war. We do not see that 
this avoidance of what in the prewar  era would have been seen as the 
51. A plausible  case can be made  that  many  of the structural  problems  Europe  faces 
today are in fact the consequences of the dramatic  increases in unemployment  that 
occurred  during  the  disinflation  of the 1980s.  Had  the  disinflation  proceeded  more  gradually, 
or had inflation  been permitted  to remain  steady, output  and employment  might  well be 
much  higher  today.  The  contraction  of the early 1980s  appears  to have  knocked  European 
output  down to an unfavorable  real equilibrium,  and in the absence of rapid  demand 
expansion  there  appears  to be no strong  push  back  toward  full employment,  just as there 
were  no strong  forces pushing  Britain  to full  employment  in the 1920s  or the United  States 
to full  employment  in the 1930s. 
52. See Benjamin  Friedman,  "Lessons on Monetary  Policy  from  the 1980s,"  Journal 
of Economic  Perspectives,  vol. 2 (Summer  1988),  pp. 51-72; William  Poole, "Monetary 
Policy  Lessons of Recent  Inflation  and  Disinflation,"  Journal  of Economic  Perspectives, 
vol. 2 (Summer  1988),  pp. 73-100. 
53.  Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary Histoty of the United 
States, 1867-1960  (Princeton  University  Press, 1963). 474  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1988 
inevitable  share  of severe recessions has lowered  the output  reached  in 
booms. And inflation  now is essentially  what it was immediately  before 
the Korean  War.  The United States has successfully avoided  all but one 
(1982)  of the postwar equivalents  of the 1894, 1908, and 1921  troughs, 
and yet has not avoided the postwar  equivalents  of the 1901, 1906,  and 
1929 peaks. On balance we  see postwar demand management  as a 
significant  success. The implicit  relative  odds that  most economists less 
committed  to the gap  view than  we are  would  give on the truth  of the gap 
and  cycle views might  well make  the continuation  of Keynesian  demand 
management  a favorable  gamble. Whether still further  significant  im- 
provement would have been possible in the postwar era-whether 
demand  management  ought  to have been even more  aggressively  expan- 
sionary  than  it has  been on average-is  a much  more  uncertain  prospect. 
APPENDIX 
Data Sources 
THE DATA for U.S. output  per person of working  age used in this paper 
come  from  recent  reworking  of pre-Depression  output  levels by Christina 
Romer,  deflated  by total U.S. population  between 16  and 65 taken  from 
Historical  Statistics  of the  United States.54 Nathan Balke and Robert 
Gordon  have also undertaken  to review the previous  estimates  of GNP. 
Throughout  the paper  we rely on the Romer  series because it is the least 
favorable  to our conclusions. It shows less of a reduction  in the size of 
the business  cycle since World  War  II than  does the Balke-Gordon  series 
or the standard  series.55  As table A-1 shows, both sets of data attribute 
smaller  recessions to the pre-Depression  economy than do the original 
estimates of Kuznets. Figures A-1 and A-2 plot the Romer, Balke and 
Gordon, and standard  series for GNP per person of working  age over 
the past century. 
The  Romer  series  is biased  against  finding  a significant  prewar  business 
cycle for yet another  reason. It is a series of fitted values adjusted  to 
54. Romer,  "The Prewar  Business  Cycle Reconsidered";  and  "Gross  National  Prod- 
uct, 1909-1928." 
55. Balke and Gordon, "Estimation  of Prewar  GNP: Methodology  and New Evi- 
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Table A-1.  Peak Declines in GNP per Working-age Adult during Recessions, 
United States,  1889-1929 
Percent  change 
Output  series 
Recession  Romer  Balke-Gordon  Standard 
1892-94  - 8.0  - 7.9  -10.4 
1895-96  ...  -4.7  -8.7 
1901-02  -0.7  -0.5 
1906-08  -7.4  -  11.9  -10.4 
1913-15  -4.3  -9.9  -10.4 
1918-21  - 3.8  -  10.0  -4.5 
1926-28  -1.3  -1.1  -1.1 
Source:  Romer series  from "Gross  National  Product,  1909-1928";  "The  Prewar Business  Cycle  Reconsidered"; 
and U.S.  Department of Commerce,  Bureau of the Census,  Historical  Statistics  of the United States,  Colonial Timies 
to  1970 (GPO,  1975). Balke-Gordon  series  from Nathan  Balke  and Robert J. Gordon,  "The  Estimation  of  Prewar 
GNP:  Methodology  and New  Evidence,"  Jouirnal of Political  Economy  (forthcoming,  1989). Standard series  from 
Historical  Statistics. 
match the standard  Kuznets-Kendrick-Gallman  series in benchmark 
years. As a result, it omits any short-run  variance  in national  product 
not correlated  with contemporaneous  movements in commodity pro- 
duction. It understates the transitory business cycle component of 
national product. As Romer acknowledges, in the postwar era the 
components  that  are omitted  from  the prewar  series account  for about  a 
fifth  of output  variance.56 
Two points  from  figures  A-  I and  A-2 are worth  noting.  The first  is the 
change in the status of the Great Depression as one moves from the 
Kuznets to the Balke-Gordon  to the Romer  estimates. In the standard 
series, the Great  Depression is simply the largest  of a number  of large 
prewar  recessions. The decline  in output  per  person  of working  age over 
the 1921  recession is at least two-thirds,  and the declines over the 1893 
and 1908 recessions at least one-third, that of the Great Depression. 
According  to the standard  series, the Great  Depression is but the most 
severe episode of a disease-severe  depression-endemic in the prewar 
United  States. By contrast,  the Romer  series  contains  no other  recession 
even one-quarter  as bad as the Great  Depression. 
The second point worth noting is the break in the apparent  cyclical 
pattern  before 1890.  The  decade  of the 1880s  sees neither  large  recessions 
nor  labor  productivity  growth.  The change in the apparent  character  of 
56. Romer,  "The Prewar  Business  Cycle Reconsidered." 476  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
Figure  A-1. Romer  Estimates  of U.S. Output  per Working-age  Adult, 1869-1987 
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Sources:  Constructed from data in Christina Romer,  "The Prewar Business  Cycle  Reconsidered:  New  Estimates 
of Gross  National Product,"  Jouirnal of Political  Economy  (forthcoming,  1989); and "Gross National  Product,  1909- 
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Figure  A-2. Cyclical  Divergence  of Standard,  Romer,  and Balke-Gordon  Estimates 
of U.S.  Output,  1870-1930 
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the business cycle raises the suspicion that the data before 1889  are of 
much lower quality.57  Accordingly,  we focus our analysis on the years 
since 1889. 
The unemployment  rate data used in subsequent  sections consist of 
the original  rate constructed by Lebergott, and the alternatives  con- 
structed  by Weir  and  Romer.58  Weir's  and  Romer's  estimates  are  almost 
surely superior to those of Lebergott, which exhibit excess cyclical 
volatility. The Romer series uses the Lebergott series as raw material 
and attempts  to compensate  for excess volatility. Weir  tries to build  his 
series up from the raw data while remaining  sensitive to assumptions 
that might introduce excess  volatility. Curiously, the Romer output 
series is more highly correlated with the Weir than with any other 
unemployment  series.59 
SAMPLE  PERIODS 
For the United States we consider two sample periods, one post- 
World  War  II and one pre-Depression.  The postwar  period  is 1947-87; 
the pre-Depression  period is 1889-1929.  We exclude the World  War  II 
period  from consideration  because we believe the mechanisms  then at 
work to produce  high levels of output  reveal little about the peacetime 
potential  of the economy. We also exclude the Depression. 
The exclusion of the Depression biases analysis against  finding  any 
significant  improvement  in economic performance.  This may not be 
appropriate.  Perhaps  the Depression should  be seen as a product  of the 
same economic structure  that produced the rest of prewar  cycles, in 
which  case the fact that  the prewar  structure  could  and  did  generate  such 
a depression  is important  evidence of deficiency  from  the standpoint  of 
macroeconomic  performance.  Since the Depression  is the most virulent 
outbreak  of depression,  there  may  be much  to be learned  from  its study. 
57.  See William Shaw, Commodity Output in the United States (Columbia University 
Press, 1947). 
58.  Stanley Lebergott,  Manpower in Economic  Growth: The American Record since 
1800  (McGraw-Hill,  1964);  Weir, "Unemployment  Volatility";  Romer,  "Spurious  Vola- 
tility  in Historical  Unemployment  Data." 
59. For the 1889-1929  sample, the R2  from regressing  unemployment  on the Romer 
output series and a time trend is 0.76 for the Weir unemployment  series, 0.70 for the 
Lebergott  unemployment  series, and  0.55 for the Romer  unemployment  series. 478  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
Figure A-3.  National Product per Capita, Canada, France, United Kingdom, 1880-1980 
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Source:  Angus Maddison,  Phases  of Capitalist Developmnent (Oxford University  Press, 1982). 
On the other  hand, the Depression  is so extraordinary  that it dominates 
statistics over any period in which it is  included. We exclude the 
Depression  from  the bulk  of the analysis,  but  we return  to it and  consider 
the lessons of the Depression  at the end of the paper. 
INTERNATIONAL  EVIDENCE 
Historians  constructing  long-run  national  accounts  have quite  rightly 
focused  on getting  the  long-run  trend  right.  They  have  placed  first  priority 
on ensuring  that the constructed series provide a good picture of the 
long-run  sweep of growth. Data that are useful for examining  not only 
long-run  growth issues but also the business cycle are rare. In our 
estimation, five industrial  economies offer data of reliable quality: 
Canada,  France, Germany,  Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Long- 
run GNP growth data for these five (and for eleven other industrial 
nations, including  the United States) have been constructed  and com- 
piled by Angus Maddison.60  National product  per capita for these five 
nations  is plotted  in figures  A-3 and  A-4. 
The United  Kingdom  estimates,  derived  by C. H. Feinstein,  are  based 
on independent  expenditure  and income series, and are thus probably 
60.  Angus  Maddison,  Phases  of Capitalist  Deivelopment (Oxford University  Press, 
1982). J. Bradford De Long, Lawrence H. Summers  479 
Figure A-4.  National Product per Capita, Germany and Sweden, 1880-1980 
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Source:, Maddison, Phases  of Capitalist Development. 
the most reliable  of any of the historical  data.61  Feinstein  was able to use 
two independent  sources of information  on aggregate  production.  The 
existence of both income-based and output-based  measures of total 
economic activity made his task easier than that of Kuznets for the 
United States. His estimates are correspondingly  less likely to suffer 
from  the kind  of excess volatility  identified  by Romer. 
Estimates  of French  production  were  constructed  by Angus  Maddison 
from data in Carre, Dubois, and Malinvaud.62  The French estimates 
appear, if anything, to underestimate  cyclical volatility. De Long's 
examination  of the path of output  during  the post-World  War  I returns 
to the gold standard  suggest that they understated  volatility  during  the 
1920s.63 
Canadian  product  estimates are derived  from 0.  J. Firestone.64  The 
Firestone estimates for Canada may suffer from the excess  cyclical 
61.  C. H. Feinstein,  National  Income,  Expenditure, and Olutplut  in the United King- 
dom, 1855-1965  (Cambridge  University  Press, 1972). 
62. Jean-Jacques  Carre, Pierre Dubois, and Edmond Malinvaud,  La Crossiance 
Franpaise (Seuil,  1972). 
63. J. Bradford  De Long, "Returning  to the Gold  Standard:  Britain  and France  in the 
1920s"  (Ph.D.  dissertation,  Harvard  University,  1987). 
64.  O. J. Firestone, Canada's EconoinicDei,elopmeent: 1867-1953 (Bowes and Bowes, 
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volatility  diagnosed  by Romer in the Kuznets-Kendrick-Gallman  esti- 
mates  for the United  States. The results  for Canada  should  be taken  with 
a grain of salt. Moreover, Canadian  macroeconomic  fluctuations  are 
closely tied to U.S.  fluctuations, and it is questionable that adding 
Canada  introduces  much  additional  real information. 
Swedish data are derived  from Olle Krantz  and Carl-Axel  Nilsson.65 
National product estimates for Sweden at the end of the nineteenth 
century  are thought  to be of very good quality  for a country  as poor as 
Sweden then was. The precocious  development  of the Swedish  govern- 
ment means that a historian  of Sweden has more government  data on 
production  than  do those of most other  countries.  The Swedish  data  are 
unlikely to suffer from excess cyclical variability;  widespread  use of 
interpolation  is more likely to make Swedish data before World  War  II 
too smooth. 
The German  data are the most questionable.  They were constructed 
by Maddison, and rely heavily on Hoffman's industrial  production 
estimates.66  The German national product data are sufficiently less 
volatile  than  Hoffman's  industrial  production  data  to raise  the suspicion 
that  the German  data  may suffer  from  deficient  volatility. 
Two different  prewar  periods  are used: a pre-World  War  I period  for 
the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, all heavily involved in 
World  War I, and the standard  pre-Depression  period for Canada  and 
Sweden. For all five nations  the post-World  War  II period  is taken  to be 
1948-79.  It thus  omits  the  post-  1980  period  of high  unemployment,  which 
we see as involving  a shortfall  of output  from potential  of a magnitude 
unseen since the Great Depression. This omission is partly due to 
necessity, for our  procedures  have no purchase  on what  potential  output 
is in Europe  today. This omission also has a substantive  rationale.  Out 
of fear  of the consequences  of real  wage  rigidity,  European  governments 
in the 1980s  have abandoned  any attempt  to stabilize  demand  at a high 
leve-l.  The prewar  to 1948-79  comparison  is thus between performance 
before the Depression and performance  while governments  were pur- 
suing  full-employment  policies. 
65.  Olle Krantz and Carl-Axel Nilsson,  Swedish  National  Product  1861-1970: New 
Aspects  on Methods and Measurement (CWK Gleerup, 1975). 
66.  Maddison, Phases  of Capitalist Development,  p. 164. Comments 
and Discussion 
N. Gregory Mankiw: Reading  this paper  brought  me back to my days 
in graduate  school when my friends  and I were looking  for dissertation 
topics. I remember  one of our elders giving us the following piece of 
advice: "It is not sufficient," he told us, "to choose a question that is 
interesting  and important.  You must also choose a question that you 
have some hope of answering." 
Bradford  De Long and Lawrence Summers  have boldly chosen not 
to follow that advice. Their  question-can  demand  management  policy 
affect the average  level of economic activity?-is  obviously interesting 
and  important.  And  even though  they seem to have no way of answering 
it, at least not convincingly, the paper usefully draws our attention  to 
the issues. 
The natural  rate  hypothesis, the target  of this paper,  has a prominent 
place in current  macroeconomics.  Most economists schooled since the 
early 1970s  accept  it as a basic  tenet. De Long  and  Summers  persuasively 
argue  that the issue is not really  resolved, either  theoretically  or empir- 
ically, and  that  macroeconomists  should  not so readily  turn  to the natural 
rate  hypothesis  when thinking  about  macroeconomic  policy. 
In assessing the validity  of the natural  rate hypothesis, we must first 
ask exactly what the hypothesis is. De Long and Summers  do not give 
us a precise statement  of the hypothesis they are suggesting  we reject. 
So let me start  by trying  to do so. 
First, I believe it is useful to make a distinction that De Long and 
Summers  do not emphasize:  between monetary  policy and other sorts 
of government  policy. The natural  rate hypothesis is a claim about the 
limited  ability  of monetary  policy. Although  it may  also have  implications 
for fiscal policy, it is not in essence a hypothesis about fiscal policy. 
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Fiscal policy clearly does affect the mean level of economic activity: 
taxes discourage  market  activity, and public goods like highways en- 
courage  it. Similarly,  regulatory  policies, such as the antitrust  laws or 
the Federal Deposit Insurance  Corporation,  affect mean output to the 
extent that they correct or create market imperfections. It is  only 
monetary  policy to which  classical economics attributes  neutrality.  The 
natural  rate hypothesis, which asserts that classical economics is right 
in the long run, is thus a hypothesis  about  the effects of money.  1 
As a statement  about monetary  policy, the natural  rate hypothesis 
can take a variety of forms. A weak form might be the following: the 
mean level of economic activity is independent  of the mean rate of 
money  growth.  This  is, I suspect, what  Friedman  and  Phelps  had  in mind 
when they proposed  the natural  rate hypothesis, since the issue of the 
day was whether  the long-run  Phillips  curve  was vertical.  Of  course, one 
can think of many reasons that even this weak form of the hypothesis 
might  be false. For example,  higher  inflation  increases  shoeleather  costs 
and  menu  costs and  crowds  in capital  through  the Mundell-Tobin  effect. 
Yet most  economistsjudge  these effects to be quantitatively  unimportant 
(except in hyperinflating  economies), and I suspect they are right. The 
weak form  of the natural  rate hypothesis seems a good first  approxima- 
tion, and  De Long and Summers  do not seem to suggest  otherwise. 
Instead, De Long and Summers  argue  against  a stronger  form  of the 
natural  rate  hypothesis,  which  might  be stated  as follows:  the mean  level 
of economic activity is independent  of the conduct of monetary  policy. 
This strong form of the hypothesis would be violated if systematic 
monetary policy, such as offsetting exogenous shocks to aggregate 
demand,  were able to alter  the mean  level of output  or unemployment. 
De Long and  Summers  correctly  point  out that  some textbook  models 
of economic fluctuations  exhibit this strong form of the natural  rate 
hypothesis. In these models, monetary  policy can affect the variability 
of output,  but  not the mean.  They also point  out that  in a variety  of more 
sophisticated  models, this strong  form of the natural  rate hypothesis is 
violated. 
As a theoretical  matter, it would be surprising  if the strong  form of 
the natural  rate hypothesis did hold. Uncertainty  plays a central  role in 
1. When  Milton  Friedman  proposed  the natural  rate  hypothesis,  he did  it in a section 
entitled "What  Monetary  Policy Cannot  Do" in a paper  called "The Role of Monetary 
Policy,"  American Economic Review,  vol. 58 (March 1968), pp. 1-17. J. Bradford De Long, Lawrence H. Summers  483 
all kinds of economic behavior. If monetary  policy can influence the 
variability  of economic activity, it can surely  influence  the level as well. 
For example, if systematic monetary  policy reduces the variability  of 
real GNP, it makes the United States a safer place to invest, which 
induces  capital  inflows  from  abroad.  At the same time, it also decreases 
the need for precautionary  saving. It is not hard  to think of numerous 
channels  through  which a reduction  in the variability  of output  alters  its 
mean  level. 
Even in textbook  models, it is easy to find  reasons  to reject  this strong 
form  of the natural  rate  hypothesis.  Many  textbooks  present  the reverse- 
L-shaped aggregate supply curve. Because of capacity constraints, 
increases  in aggregate  demand  raise  prices more  quickly  than  decreases 
in aggregate  demand  lower  them.  This  aggregate  supply  curve, or indeed 
any  convex aggregate  supply  curve,  will  imply  that  stabilization  increases 
mean  output. 
This convexity of aggregate supply is potentially important. For 
example, when economists estimate Phillips curves, the convexity of 
aggregate  supply often enters because the reciprocal  of the unemploy- 
ment rate, rather  than the level, enters the equation. Such an expecta- 
tions-augmented  Phillips  curve would  be 
,a = Es  +  ot +  3(1/U). 
Since expectation  errors  must  average  to zero, this specification  implies 
that  the Federal  Reserve cannot influence  the mean  of the reciprocal  of 
the  unemployment  rate.  Yet, because  of Jensen's  inequality,  the Federal 
Reserve can influence  the mean of the level of the unemployment  rate. 
Straightforward  calculations  using unemployment  data show that if the 
reciprocal  of the unemployment  rate  had  been stabilized  around  its mean 
over the past 10 years, the mean unemployment  rate would have been 
7.2 percent  rather  than  7.4 percent.  Assuming  an Okun's  Law coefficient 
of 2.5, this 0.2 reduction in mean unemployment over a decade is 
equivalent  to 5 percent of one year's GNP. Hence, stabilizing  unem- 
ployment  over a decade is roughly  equivalent  to averting  a moderate- 
sized single-year  recession. 
Such  a calculation  is, of course, merely  speculative.  As far  as I know, 
there has been little work aimed at examining the convexity of the 
aggregate  supply curve. Perhaps in the future there should be, for it 
seems  that  the benefit  of economic stabilization  depends  crucially  on the 
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De Long and Summers's  rejection  of the strong  form of the natural 
rate hypothesis is, however, not based on the estimation of such a 
structural  equation. Their reticence to perform  any sort of structural 
estimation  seems to stem from an agnosticism  over precisely why the 
natural  rate hypothesis fails. The closest they come to structural  esti- 
mation-and  this is my favorite part of the paper-is  examining the 
differential  impact  of positive and  negative  demand  shocks  on real  GNP, 
following  work by Cover. Unfortunately,  the evidence is not clear-cut: 
while the point  estimates  suggest  some asymmetry,  they are  usually  not 
statistically  significant. 
Most of De Long and Summers's  inferences come from examining 
the univariate  properties  of real GNP in the prewar  and postwar  econ- 
omies. They present us with some intriguing  observations. Unfortu- 
nately, the relation of  these observations to  the hypothesis under 
question  is informal  and  often hard  to follow. 
For example, one of their observations  is that fluctuations  in output 
are more  persistent  in the postwar  period  than  in the prewar  period. De 
Long and Summers  interpret  this fact as evidence that macroeconomic 
policy has improved. One could just as plausibly draw the opposite 
inference: one might suppose that good policymakers correct their 
mistakes  while bad  policymakers  let their  mistakes  persist. 
Yet even if we accept the interpretation  of the data suggested  by De 
Long and Summers,  I am not sure what it tells us about  the natural  rate 
hypothesis. There were many changes in the economy between these 
two periods. De Long and Summers provide no evidence that the 
observed  changes  in output  had  anything  to do with monetary  policy, or 
that these changes are informative  regarding  the effects of monetary 
policy. Even if we concede that  macroeconomic  performance  improved, 
and  concede that  policy of some sort  was responsible,  I am  not sure  how 
to make  the leap to rejecting  the natural  rate  hypothesis. 
The  univariate  approach  taken  by De Long  and  Summers  simply  lacks 
sufficient  power to be useful in answering  their question. The fact that 
macroeconomists  are  rarely  in consensus shows how difficult  it is to test 
competing  theories  in macroeconomics,  even when given all the data  at 
our disposal. Examining  the time series properties  of real GNP alone 
may refine  our set of stylized facts about the business cycle, but it will 
inevitably  fail to produce  compelling  evidence for  or against  a claim  such 
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In summary,  I believe De Long and Summers  have usefully raised 
some interesting  and important  questions. I doubt that this paper will 
convert  believers  in the natural  rate  hypothesis.  But  it should  make  them 
more  open to the alternatives. 
Christina  D. Romer: In their  paper,  De Long and  Summers  use various 
types of evidence to argue that macroeconomic  performance  has im- 
proved since World  War  II. They state that changes in the output  gap, 
the skewness of unemployment,  and the persistence of real GNP all 
suggest  that  stabilization  policy has been successful. In these comments 
I suggest that some of De Long and Summers's  empirical  results are 
flawed and that their interpretation  of these results is potentially  mis- 
leading. 
My first comment  concerns De Long and Summers's  interpretation 
of their  findings  about  output  gaps. They argue  that in assessing macro- 
economic performance, large falls in production should be counted 
differently  from  large  rises in production.  That  is, they suggest  that it is 
more instructive to compare the average deviation of output from 
potential-the  gap-between  the prewar  and postwar  eras than to look 
at how a simple  measure  of volatility, such as the standard  deviation  of 
percentage  changes,  changes  over  the same  period.  This  point  is sensible, 
and if gap- and  volatility-based  measures  of performance  yielded differ- 
ent conclusions about stabilization  over time, I would find this result 
very interesting. 
From the tone of the paper, one gets the impression  that gap-based 
measures  of macroeconomic  performance  do indeed show much more 
stabilization  over time than do volatility-based measures calculated 
using  the same  data.  To quote  De Long  and  Summers,  "Such  a difference 
in the size of the average  gap is striking  given the near-equality  of the 
volatility-based  estimates of business cycle size." In truth, however, 
the results that they get using a gap-based measure of the change in 
macroeconomic  performance  are very similar  to those derived using 
simple  volatility-based  measures  of performance.  This similarity  can be 
seen in table 4 of their paper. Based on my prewar  estimates of GNP, 
the ratio of the standard  deviation of percentage changes in the pre- 
Depression  era to that  in the post-World  War  II era  is 1.46.  De Long and 
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deviation  of GNP from potential, is 1.52 for the same sample periods. 
Clearly,  both measures  show about  the same  degree  of stabilization  over 
time. 
Given that sensible volatility-  and gap-based  measures  of macroeco- 
nomic performance  show essentially the same amount  of stabilization 
over time, it is clear that using gaps is not crucial to De Long and 
Summers's  belief that we have tamed the business cycle. Rather, any 
apparent  conflict between my work and that of De Long and Summers 
comes from how one interprets  a stabilization  ratio of 1.5. I tend to see 
it as small  because  I was used to seeing  ratios  of 2 or 3 when  conventional 
data  were used. Therefore,  when my revised data showed a ratio  below 
1.5, I stressed that there was less stabilization  than we once believed. 
On  the other  hand,  De Long  and  Summers  came up with  a number  of 1.5 
and noticed that it was substantially  bigger than one and therefore 
stressed  that  there  had  been some stabilization  over time. 
Both of these interpretations  are defensible, but neither  really deals 
with the question of how much stabilization  a ratio of  1.5 actually 
represents. De Long and Summers seem to believe that any number 
bigger than one is important  and represents a triumph  for Keynesian 
stabilization  policy and automatic  stabilizers. But it is surely the case 
that at some point a small decline in the mean gap is not worth the 
potentially  distortionary  effects of procyclical taxation and misguided 
government  expenditure.  Furthermore,  they provide no evidence that 
stabilization  policy is what actually  accounts for any stabilization  that 
we observe. Policy could have stabilized the economy. But it is also 
possible  that  shocks to the economy could  have been different  in the two 
periods  or that structural  changes in the economy could have tended to 
improve  macroeconomic  performance. 
In  addition  to questions  about  De Long  and  Summers's  interpretation 
of the behavior  of the output  gap, one can also question  their  method  for 
constructing  a measure of the gap. Estimating  potential GNP is very 
difficult  and inevitably  involves many  choices. Throughout  their  analy- 
sis, nearly  all of De Long and Summers's  choices cause the postwar  gap 
to be smaller than would result from an easily justifiable alternative 
choice. Thus, I would suggest that 1.5 should be viewed as an upper 
bound  on a plausible  ratio  of average  prewar  to postwar  gap, and that it 
would  be easy to derive  sensible  gap-based  measures  that  showed either 
no improvement  or a worsening  of macroeconomic  performance  over 
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Let me give a few examples  of how their  estimates  of potential  output 
are  biased  toward  minimizing  postwar  gaps  and  maximizing  prewar  gaps. 
One of the criteria  that they use in estimating  potential is that actual 
output can never be above potential. They, however, exempt World 
War  II from this requirement  and assume that essentially all of the rise 
in output during  the war was due to unusual  wartime  conditions. This 
assumption  enables De Long and Summers  to claim that the late 1940s 
and  early 1950s  were periods  of excellent performance,  equivalent  in the 
absence of gaps to the late 1960s.  However, it seems more appropriate 
to view at least some of the gains in output during  World War II as 
evidence that  potential  was higher  than  the subsequent  level of produc- 
tion in 1948  or 1950  might  indicate. 
A common  argument  for excluding  World  War  II is that much  of the 
increased  production  during  the war was due to the entrance  of women 
into the labor force in unprecedented  numbers. That the labor force 
participation  rate of women then decreases after the war is taken as a 
sign that such levels of production  could not have been sustained.  This 
common argument  neglects the fact that after the war there was a 
concerted  effort  by policymakers  and managers  to get women out of the 
labor force-or  at least out of "good jobs at good wages." Several 
authors  have  argued  that  women  were  forced  out ofjobs that  they wished 
to keep because returning  soldiers were deemed more worthy of em- 
ployment.  I  If women  wartime  workers  wished to keep working  in highly 
productive  factory  jobs, then potential output should be seen as very 
high  in the late 1940s  and early 1950s,  the gap should  be viewed as very 
large,  and  policy should  be viewed as responsible  for  large  output  losses. 
In this case gap-based  measures  of macroeconomic  performance  would 
show marked  deterioration  between  the pre-Depression  and  post-World 
War  II eras. 
A related issue concerning  wars and the measurement  of potential 
output involves the treatment of World War I. While De Long and 
Summers  are careful not to include World War II as a postwar peak, 
they do allow 1918  to be a peak. This naturally  tends to make  the gap in 
the early 1920s  larger  than it would have been if World  War  I had been 
eliminated from the  sample. Furthermore,  De  Long and Summers 
accentuate  the  peak  in 1918  by deflating  output  by the  resident  population 
1. See Ruth Milkman,  Gender  at Work  (University  of Illinois Press, 1987),  for an 
excellent  description  of the effects of demobilization  on female  wartime  workers  as well 
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aged 16 and over, rather  than the total population  aged 16 and over, 
which would include persons serving in the armed services overseas. 
Given that GNP includes the output  of the armed  services (proxied  by 
government  spending),  there is no justification  for looking at GNP per 
resident  person  of working  age rather  than  per person  of working  age. If 
this alternative  procedure  were followed, both the percentage  change 
and the gap in 1920 and 1921 would be substantially  smaller  than De 
Long and Summers  find. This would tend to make the prewar  era look 
more  like the postwar  era than  their  numbers  indicate. 
Before leaving  the empirical  issues involved in measuring  the output 
gap, it is important  to mention  De Long  and  Summers's  use of European 
data to validate the decline in the U.S. gap over time. In contrast to 
Steven Sheffrin,  who finds, using a volatility-based  measure, that Eu- 
ropean  countries  have not stabilized  over time, De Long and Summers 
conclude that various industrial  democracies  have shown an improve- 
ment in macroeconomic  performance  between the prewar  and postwar 
eras.2 However, this  finding  does not come  from  De Long  and  Summers's 
use of gaps, but  from  the fact that  they stop their  postwar  sample  in 1979. 
This exclusion of the 1980s  is unjustifiable  and  is in no way similar  to the 
exclusion of the 1930s.  The Great  Depression can rightly  be left out of 
comparisons  between the prewar  and postwar eras because we do not 
know to which era it actually belongs. If one is using the prewar  and 
postwar  eras  to proxy  for  the  periods  before  and  after  activist  government 
policy, a case can be made that the Depression belongs in the postwar 
era because both monetary  policy and fiscal policy first started being 
used on a substantial  scale during  and  after  World  War  I. The same kind 
of argument  cannot  be made  for the current  high  unemployment  in Great 
Britain  and other European  countries. Surely these countries  have not 
forgotten  the policies that  De Long  and  Summers  think  account  for their 
fine  performance  before 1979. 
My remaining  comments  concern  the other  types of evidence that  De 
Long and Summers  offer in support  of their view that macroeconomic 
performance  has improved  markedly.  First, they argue  that  a decline in 
the skewness of the unemployment  rate series is evidence that postwar 
policy has filled in troughs without shaving off peaks. The empirical 
2.  Steven M. Sheffrin, "Have  Economic  Fluctuations  Been Dampened?" Journal of 
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evidence of such  a decline  in skewness, however, is weak. The apparent 
skewness of the Lebergott  and  Romer  prewar  series shown  in figure  2 of 
the paper  is due entirely to the high unemployment  rates of the 1890s. 
This is important  because both Lebergott and Romer stress that the 
unemployment  estimates for the 1890s are based on much sketchier 
information  than  are  later  estifnates.  In this regard,  the fact that  the Weir 
unemployment  series does not show significantly  more skewness than 
the modern  series is telling  because one of Weir's main  contributions  is 
to improve  the unemployment  series for the 1890s.3  Given the behavior 
of the Weir  series, one would have to conclude  that  there  is no evidence 
of a decrease  in the skewness of unemployment  over time. 
The final type of evidence about improvement  in macroeconomic 
behavior  that De Long and Summers  consider  is the possible decline in 
the persistence of fluctuations  in real GNP over time. One of the main 
pieces of evidence that they invoke to suggest that prewar  fluctuations 
were transitory  in a way that postwar fluctuations  are not is that we 
recovered from the Great Depression. Leaving aside the question of 
whether  the Great  Depression  can tell us anything  about the prewar  or 
postwar  eras in general,  I want to disagree  with their  view of the health 
of the economy in the late 1930s.  De Long and Summers  argue  that the 
economy had recovered from the Depression quite substantially  even 
before  the United  States  entered  World  War  II. This  view seems difficult 
to reconcile with the fact that the BLS estimate of the unemployment 
rate is 17.2 percent in 1939 and 14.6 percent in 1940. Even Michael 
Darby's alternative  estimates of the interwar  unemployment  rate are 
nearly 10 percent as late as 1940.4  These figures suggest to me that 
without World  War II, the economy quite possibly would never have 
made up the output losses of the 1930s. In this case the fact that we 
recovered from the Great Depression is merely evidence that large 
positive shocks sometimes follow large negative shocks, even if the 
underlying  process is white noise. 
More generally, I am skeptical that their evidence on persistence 
provides  important  evidence about  the effectiveness of postwar  stabili- 
3.  David R.  Weir,  "Unemployment  Volatility,  1890-1984:  A Sensitivity  Analysis" 
(Yale University,  1986). 
4.  Michael R. Darby, "Three-and-a-Half Million U.S.  Employees  Have Been Mislaid: 
Or, an Explanation of Unemployment,  1934-194 1  ," Journal ofPolitical  Economy,  vol. 84 
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zation policy. First, it is not clear that successful stabilization  policy 
should be expected to make output movements more persistent. Suc- 
cessful policy would  reduce  the importance  of transitory  cyclical move- 
ments. But as De Long and Summers  have argued  elsewhere, because 
policy should be best able to prevent  predictable  cyclical movements, 
successful policy would be likely to make the cyclical movements that 
remain  less persistent.5  The overall effect of these two influences on 
persistence is ambiguous.  And, as with stabilization  itself, changes in 
factors other than policy, such as institutions  and the size and form of 
technology  shocks, could also affect persistence. 
Furthermore,  given that De Long and Summers  and I already  agree 
that there has been some stabilization,  any evidence on persistence is 
essentially impossible to interpret. The central issue is  how much 
stabilization  there has been. Does the change in persistence that De 
Long and Summers believe has occurred suggest a large or a small 
amount of stabilization?  De Long and Summers provide no way of 
addressing  this issue. 
To conclude, I would  have to say that  despite  the promising  topic, the 
paper  by De Long and Summers  is ultimately  unsatisfying.  Using gaps 
does not materially  alter  the conclusions  drawn  from  other, less subjec- 
tive measures of macroeconomic  performance,  and the evidence on 
skewness and  persistence  is subject  to alternative  interpretations.  More 
important,  De Long  and  Summers  provide  no way of evaluating  whether 
any improvement  in macroeconomic  performance  that may have oc- 
curred  is large  or small  and whether  any of the change  could have been 
due to policy. They seem content to say that since policy could have 
caused it, we should  conclude  that  policy was effective. This argument, 
I'm afraid,  will never convince anyone who does not already  believe. 
General  Discussion 
Laurence Ball supported the empirical proposition that demand 
shocks have asymmetric  effects on output and that stabilization  can 
therefore  affect average  output, but found the theoretical  explanations 
5. J. Bradford  De Long and Lawrence  H. Summers,  "The Changing  Cyclical  Varia- 
bility  of Economic  Activity  in the United  States," in Robert  J. Gordon,  ed., The  Amesrican 
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offered by De Long and Summers  for such asymmetries  inadequate. 
Ball  was particularly  critical  of the models  of price  rigidity  that  De Long 
and Summers offered as explanations of the asymmetric effects of 
demand shocks. He noted that fixed-price  models with rationing  are 
inadequate  theoretical models of price rigidity  because the rigidity is 
added exogenously. More rigorous  models of price rigidity, featuring 
price setters with market  power, do not imply that price setters will be 
more likely to adjust  prices up rather  than down. Similarly,  Ball noted 
that there is no theoretical model explaining why prices should be 
adjusted more quickly upward than downward. Theories in which 
demand  shocks cause credit  collapses display  asymmetric  output  effects 
because, between collapses, the economy runs at potential. However, 
Ball observed that credit collapses do not explain most postwar reces- 
sions, though  they may help explain  the Great  Depression. 
David Romer suggested that stabilization  policy does not need to 
raise mean  output  to have large  welfare  benefits.  Although  in the simple 
calculations  of Lucas there  is little  gain  from  stabilization,  if the benefits 
of stabilizing  employment  are  considered,  with  an inelastic  labor  supply, 
the gains  increase  substantially.  The necessary  asymmetry  enters  through 
the utility function rather  than through  the aggregate  supply function. 
Inelastic labor supply means that variation  in average hours reduces 
utility;  people do not get much  pleasure  out of their  extra  leisure during 
recessions, but suffer considerable disutility from the extra work re- 
quired  in a boom. Workers  would require  a large  increase  in real wages 
to compensate for working a few more hours, and they would not 
willingly  choose to work  fewer hours  unless real wages plummet. 
Edmund  Phelps proposed a simple model explaining  why workers 
voluntarily  supply  labor  above the natural  rate  of employment.  Employ- 
ers set a real wage above the market-clearing  level to minimize  labor 
costs per  efficiency  unit  of work. At the natural  rate  equilibrium,  the real 
wage is high enough to generate involuntary  unemployment,  and the 
fear  of unemployment  prevents  workers  from  shirking.  A firm  faced with 
a demand  shock hires  more  workers  either  because it suspects the shock 
is affecting  only its own demand  or because the pay scale of the firm 
cannot  be adjusted  in the short  run. If it is an aggregate  demand  shock, 
all firms  increase employment,  and the aggregate  level of employment 
exceeds its natural  rate. Phelps emphasized  that in this model workers 
are happy  to supply  labor  above the natural  rate; it is the firms  that are 
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Robert Hall applauded  De Long and Summers  for abandoning  the 
natural  rate hypothesis, a theory  whose acceptance, in his opinion, had 
been a victory  of theory  over fact. He noted that  estimates  of the natural 
rate of unemployment  tend to track the actual unemployment  rate, 
making  the theory  empirically  empty. Phelps  disagreed,  arguing  that  the 
natural  rate  is relatively  stable  in the United States and, in any case, that 
shifts in the natural  rate are not evidence against  the theory. He noted 
that  economists do not abandon  the concept of money demand  because 
estimates  of money demand  are unstable. 
Hall went on to observe that real business cycle theory and some 
theories of multiple  equilibriums  abandon  the natural  rate. He recom- 
mended that the term "thick-market  externalities" replace the term 
"demand externalities" as a way to identify new models of multiple 
equilibriums  that  predict  that  the economy  will drift  from  one equilibrium 
to another.  He found it misleading  to suggest that in models with thick- 
market  externalities,  the economy is generally  lodged  at the high-output 
equilibrium,  only occasionally slipping to lower-level equilibriums. 
However, the models  are  consistent  with  the proposition  that successful 
monetary  policy might  ensure  that  the economy lodges at the high-level 
equilibrium. 
Hall explained that the central implication of models with thick- 
market externalities is that economic activity will be bunched, most 
obviously during  weekdays, daylight  hours, and the Christmas  season. 
The central  question  is whether  business cycles are actually  an optimal 
bunching  of economic activity. If so, this would undermine  the basic 
proposition  of De Long and Summers  that the economy ought to be 
stabilized  at the high-level  equilibrium.  Hall noted that wars represent 
an extreme example of the bunching  of economic activity. He agreed 
with Christina  Romer  that  wars also represent  a challenge  to the output 
gap methodology. Even if the wages of draftees are subtracted  from 
GNP, De Long  and  Summers  would  still  show  a large  negative  gap  during 
World War II. Hall concluded that the economics of World War II 
deserves as much  attention  as the economics of the Depression. 
George  von Furstenberg  suggested  that  the main  effect of government 
policy was often to reduce the mean level of output  through  misguided 
microeconomic  policies. He pointed  to the requirement  in many Euro- 
pean countries  that  firms  provide  extensive insurance  for their  employ- 
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wage  but  also assume  an  additional  contingent  liability  that  becomes due 
if the firm  ever wishes to lay off the employee. Von Furstenberg  noted 
that these indirect  labor costs, which may be nearly as large as direct 
wage costs, contribute  to the high unemployment  rate in Europe by 
inhibiting  firms  from  hiring  additional  employees unless they perceive a 
nearly  permanent  increase  in demand. 
Matthew  Shapiro  criticized the presumption  that good government 
policy could have kept the level of output  at the peak-to-peak  measures 
of potential  output  drawn  by De Long and Summers.  Shapiro  reasoned 
the measure  of potential output has to be related to the technological 
capacity of the economy and proposed a more structural  analysis that 
looks at the behavior  of capacity and labor  input  as well as output. He 
noted further  that  the finding  that  output  has become more  persistent  in 
the postwar period does not necessarily imply that government  policy 
has become more  effective. The finding  is also consistent  with Christina 
Romer's  view that  transitory  measurement  error  has been reduced. 
Robert Gordon was surprised  that De Long and Summers never 
mention prices even though Summers  has been highly critical of real 
business cycle models that ignore prices. Gordon  contended that the 
empirical  validity  of the natural  rate  hypothesis  comes from  its ability  to 
explain  trends  in  aggregate  prices, such  as the increasing  rates  of inflation 
over the 1960s.  He called attention  to new findings  on prices before the 
Depression  that support  the argument  that post-World  War  II govern- 
ment policy has increased average output. Previous researchers had 
looked at deflators  created  from  crude  and  intermediate  materials  prices 
and  concluded  that  pre-World  WarI  prices  were  quite  flexible.  However, 
data  on prices paid by consumers  before World  War  I, collected by Al 
Rees in the 1950s, suggest that prices were actually quite sticky. That 
inflation  did not accelerate  in the prosperous  period  from 1901  to 1906, 
in the period  before World  War  I, or in the relatively  prosperous  years 
of the mid-1920s  suggests that the economy never reached potential 
output  in any of those early  periods. 
Gordon  noted that measures  of potential  output  can be derived  from 
Okun's  Law using  a measure  of the unemployment  rate. Such measures 
of potential  show substantial  changes in growth rates between bench- 
mark  years. Therefore,  Gordon  was not persuaded  by the evidence that 
the unemployment  rate is correlated  more strongly  with De Long and 
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trend. It is  not clear whether the higher correlation is  due to the 
superiority  of a gap methodology  to a cycle methodology  or simply to 
the breaks  in the growth  rate of the peak-to-peak  measure  of potential 
used to construct  the gap. 
Martin Baily observed that the Depression is really the primary 
evidence in favor of De Long and Summers's  criticism  of natural  rate 
theory. Taken literally, equation 2, which is derived from the natural 
rate hypothesis, implies that the economy should have emerged  from 
the Depression  with a legacy of deflation  and  hence a chance  to grow  for 
years to come without fear of inflation.  In fact, the economy did not 
seem to gain any such benefit  from  the Depression. Baily reasoned  that 
stabilization  policy should be designed to avoid persistent downturns 
such as the Depression. He interpreted  the current  high  unemployment 
rates in Europe  as a sign that European  governments  have abandoned 
even this modest  version of stabilization  policy. 
Gordon criticized Christina  Romer'  s suggestion that monetary or 
fiscal policy could be interpreted  as activist during  the Depression. He 
noted  that  in  the late 1930s  the idea  of "pushing  on a string"  was invented 
to argue  that  monetary  policy was ineffective,  and  cited  E. Cary  Brown's 
finding  that  the full-employment  government  surplus,  including  all  levels 
of government,  was contractionary  during  the whole Roosevelt admin- 
istration  up through  1940.  Romer  responded  that even though  govern- 
ment  policy may have been used perversely  during  the Depression, the 
tools of government  policy, such as open market  operations and the 
ability  to increase  government  spending,  were available. 